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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Should drunken drivers who cause injury or 
death due to intoxication be subject to punitive damages? 
2. When there is evidence that a pre-existing 
condition was asymptomatic before an accident, and became 
symptomatic only after that accident, must the jury be 
instructed that the defendant is liable for the entire 
resulting disability when that pre-existing dormant condi-
tion "lights up1' and becomes symptomatic because of the 
accident? 
3. Must the jury be clearly instructed that it 
has to award something for general damages when it finds 
that a pre-existing condition has been aggravated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action for damages caused 
by an automobile accident and alleged that punitive damages 
should be awarded because of defendant's intoxication and 
her reckless and wanton disregard of plaintiff's safety. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the punitive 
damages issue was granted. 
Defendant admitted liability before trial and the 
issue of compensatory damages was tried to the jury. The 
1 
jury awarded special damages of $436.63 and general damages 
of $500. 
FACTS 
The Accident. The accident occurred at the 
T-intersection of 5065 West and North Temple in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Plaintiff was proceeding west on North Temple 
and defendant, who had been southbound on 50 6 5 West, at-
tempted to make a left turn onto North Temple (R.2). 
At that location, 5065 West is controlled by a 
stop sign (R.617, p.15-16) which defendant either failed to 
obey or honored and left without observing plaintiff's 
approaching car (R.617, p.16). Plaintiff did not think that 
defendant stopped. (Id.). 
After the accident, defendant stated that she was 
going to leave the scene without waiting for the police. 
(R.617, p.23). Plaintiff noted that defendant acted "as if 
she had been drinking."1 (Id.) Defendant had trouble stand-
ing up (Id) . Her breath smelled of alcohol, and to use 
plaintiff's words, "it about knocked me over." (R.617, P.24) 
Defendant had a hard time finding her license (R.603). 
Later it was learned that defendant had been to a 
wine and cheese party just prior to the accident (R.601). 
Her intoxication level was .10, and she was convicted for 
drunk driving. (Id.) Of course, evidence of running the 
stop sign and intoxication was not presented to the jury. 
The Injuries. Plaintiff was 42 at the time of 
trial (R.514). Like all individuals, degenerative changes 
had occurred to her spine before the accident (R.583)• The 
observable degeneration which had occurred to plaintiff's 
discs was like that which occurs in all individuals as a 
normal part of the aging process. (Id). Plaintiff's experts 
assigned a 3 to 5 percent rating to the pre-existing condi-
tion (R.83). 
Although the extent of the injuries suffered as a 
result of the accident is disputed, plaintiff's position was 
that she did not experience back pain as such prior to the 
accident (R. 528, 573, 574). To be sure, she had felt back 
pain on prior occasions, but plaintiff testified that most 
of that pain was associated with other body ailments and 
that the back pain cleared up when those ailments were taken 
care of (R. 528, 547, 572). The remaining episodes had 
ceased prior to the accident and were in different locations 
from the low back pain experienced after the accident (R. 
528, 547, 566). 
Plaintiff informed the doctors who examined her 
that at the time of impact, she did not have any back 
pains.(R. 573). At trial, she testified that she started to 
feel low back pain only after she had gotten out of the car 
and had began to walk around.(R. 523). 
Copies of the Record for the pages referred to in 
the part of this section preceding this footnote are 
attached collectively as Exhibit "A". 
Following the accident, plaintiff first saw the 
practitioners who had previously treated other types of 
ailments, now complaining of low back pain. (R. 523). She 
was eventually referred to a specialist and saw two ortho-
pedic doctors as a result of the accident (R.524, 525). 
Because of the accident she has also been treated by a 
chiropractor whom she saw at least 65 times over a two and 
one-half year period (R. 562) . 
Plaintiff testified that her back now hurts every 
day. (R. 527). Although she works as a waitress, her back 
often "hurts with every step". (R. 526). Before the acci-
dent, plaintiff had had secretarial and accounting training, 
but because of her back pain, she cannot remain sitting for 
a long enough time to do those jobs now (R. 518) . Plain-
tiff1 s experts testified that her total impairment rating 
for her low back condition was between 9 to 10 percent 
(R.84). 
The contested jury instruction. One theory of the 
case advanced by plaintiff was that plaintiff's back condi-
tion was asymptomatic prior to the accident and became 
symptomatic or "lit up" because of the accident (R. 502, 
594-595). Plaintiff's requested instruction No. 11 (R. 266) 
which accurately and conservatively set forth the law to be 
applied in such a situation was rejected by the Court. In 
its place, the Court gave its own instruction, No. 17 which 
4 
merely informed the jury that any aggravation of a pre-
existing condition "should be considered . . . in determin-
ing general damages" after specifically stating that 
plaintiff could not recover for any pre-existing condition 
(R. 305). A copy of plaintiff's proposed instruction is 
attached as Exhibit "B" and the instruction given by the 
Court is attached as Exhibit "C". 
Plaintiff excepted to the trial court's instruc-
tion and its refusal to give plaintiff's instruction on that 
issue, (R. 595-596). 
The punitive damages decision. Plaintiff's 
complaint contained a claim for punitive damages based upon 
the reckless and wanton conduct of the defendant as evi-
denced by defendant's intoxication and the way in which the 
accident occurred (R.2-3). Defendant moved for partial 
summary judgment on that issue, and the motion was granted. 
The District Court held that under Utah law there must be 
"actual malice" before punitive damages can be awarded (R. 
153). The Court acknowledged that plaintiff's complaint 
stated a claim for punitive damages "based upon malice in 
law" but ruled that "legal malice" was no longer a suffi-
cient basis for punitive damages in Utah. (Id). 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Punitive damages should be available as a addi-
tional tool to deter drunk driving. The overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue 
have held that drunk driving may support an award of puni-
tive damages. 
Most jurisdictions, including Utah, which allow 
punitive damages hold that either actual malice or implied 
malice permit an award of punitive damages. In the drunk 
driving context, becoming intoxicated knowing that one will 
be driving on the public streets and highways and driving in 
that condition at least presents a fact question concerning 
whether such a person is acting with reckless disregard for 
the safety and rights of others. 
The District Court's rationale for dismissing 
plaintiff's punitive damage claim was historically and 
analytically wrong. Like most jurisdictions which allow 
punitive damages, Utah's Supreme Court has stated that 
"legal malice" will support an award of punitive damages. A 
recent false imprisonment case which required actual malice 
in the shoplifting-false imprisonment context was expressly 
limited to its facts and did not even purport to overrule 
the lengthy list of cases which had held or stated that 
punitive damages could also be awarded where there was a 
6 
reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others. The 
most recent Supreme Court case on punitive damages stated 
that legal malice is sufficient. 
With respect to compensatory damages, plaintiff 
was entitled to have the jury clearly instructed on her 
theory of the case. Although the damage issues were hotly 
disputed, there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to 
find that plaintiff's pre-existing degenerative back condi-
tion was dormant and asymptomatic immediately prior to the 
accident. In situations were an injury activates or "lights 
up" a previously asymptomatic condition, the defendant is 
liable for the full disability which results. Consequently, 
plaintiff was entitled to an instruction which would inform 
the jury that they should award damages for any such "light-
ing up". The court refused to give such an instruction to 
the jury and thereby failed to instruct the jury on one of 
plaintiff's theories of the case. 
The instruction which the court gave on aggra-
vation was further inadequate because it did not require the 
jury to award damages for any aggravation. By simply 
stating that aggravation should "be considered" in awarding 
compensatory damage, the trial court left it to the jury's 
discretion to award damages or not even if they found the 
pre-existing condition was aggravated. The law clearly 
provides that where there is an injury, there should be at 
least some award of damages, and it was wrong for the trial 
court to fail to instruct clearlv on that matter. 
The shortcomings of the trial court's instructions 
were especially misleading in the context in which they 
occurred. The trial court informed they jury that it could 
not award anything for the pre-existing condition in 
explicit terms. Although that is the law, in such 
circumstances the court should be just as careful in 
explaining what they can award damages for. 
ARGUMENT 
I. COMPELLING SOCIAL POLICY MANDATES SUPPORT FOR 
THE USE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DRUNK DRIVING 
CASES 
A. Drunk Driving is a Monstrous Social 
Problem Where Additional Deterrents 
are Needed 
Pursuant to Rule 201
 f Utah Rules of Evidence, 
plaintiff requests this Court take judicial notice of the 
state and national reports on the effects of drunk drivers 
which are attached as Exhibit f,D" , "E" , "F" and "G". 
As noted in Exhibit "G": 
Drunk drivers kill about the same number of 
people each day as were killed when a jet in 
January 1982 crashed into the 14th Street 
Bridge in Washington claiming about 70 lives. 
* * * 
In the past ten years alone an estimated 
250,000 people, about five times the number 
of Americans killed in the Vietnam War, have 
been killed in alcohol-related crashes. 
Exhibit "D" is the Presidential Commission on 
Drunk Driving, Final Report 1983. There, the Commission 
writes: 
To assure the system is working, a continuous 
mechanism is needed to review arrest proce-
dures, existing laws, charging and sentencing 
procedures, the effectiveness of alternative 
sanctions, and the adequacy of diagnostic, 
screening, rehabilitation, and correctional 
facilities and programs. 
[Emphasis added.] 
These reports show that available criminal sanc-
tions are not enough. Additional deterrents to drunk 
driving are needed. As the Oregon Supreme Court said: 
It may be debatable whether either 
awards of punitive damages or the imposition 
of criminal penalties will effectively deter 
persons from driving after drinking. Howev-
er, in the absence of a showing of substan-
tial evidence to the contrary, we are not 
prepared to hold that law enforcement offi-
cials and courts, who have a heavy respon-
sibility in this area, are wrong in their 
present apparent assumption that both crimi-
nal penalties and awards of punitive damages 
may have at least some deterrent effect in 
dealing with this serious problem. We are 
also not aware of any good reasons why 
punitive damages should not have as much 
deterrent effect upon this type of wanton and 
reckless conduct as upon other types of 
conduct in which awards of punitive damages 
are traditionally approved by the courts. 
Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211, 215 (Or. 
1973) . 
It should also be remembered that the purpose of 
punitive damages is not only to deter others from anti-
social conduct, but also to deter a specific defendant from 
9 
engaging in such conduct in the future. Peterson v. 
Superior Court of Ventura County, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 181 Cal. 
Rptr. 784, 642 P.2d 1305 (1982); Sebastian v. Wood, 66 
N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1954). 
B#
 Use of Punitive Damages in Drunk 
Driving Cases is Consistent with 
Clear Legislative Intent 
The Utah Legislature has expressed its strong 
resolve to punish drunk drivers by passing one of the 
strongest and most severe impaired driving laws in the 
country. See §41-6-43, <st seq. The new law provides 
mandatory jail sentences for first time offenders as well as 
the mandatory suspension of a driverfs license. 
In addition, the 1981 Legislature passed the Dram 
Shop Act which creates liability for those who provide 
intoxicating liquors which result in injuries to third 
persons. Section 32-11-1 and §32-11-2, Utah Code Ann. 
(Presently found at Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Ann.). 
Use of punitive damages is consistent with goals 
underlying this legislation. On this issue, the Court of 
Appeals of North Carolina in Huff v. Chrismon, 315 S.E.2d 
711 (N.C. App. 1984) , noted: 
There appears to be a growing trend in 
this State to maximize the punishment and 
deterrents which impaired drivers are sub-
jected to. This trend is seen in the recent 
enactment of the "Safe Roads Act" with its 
stiff penalties for impaired drivers. This 
state's growing concern and outrage stemming 
from injuries and deaths caused by impaired 
drivers is further seen in our court's 
recognition of a common-law dram-shop liabil-
ity. 
* * * 
We believe that punitive damages when 
used in conjunction with the sanctions of the 
"Safe Roads Act" are consistent with the 
trend to maximize punishment and deterrents 
of impaired drivers and would have a far-
reaching impact. 315 S.E.2d at 715. 
[Empha sis added.] 
II. MOST AUTHORITIES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED THE 
ISSUE NOW HOLD THAT PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAN BE 
AWARDED AGAINST DRUNK DRIVERS 
The jurisdictions which have considered the issue 
now almost uniformly hold that driving while intoxicated can 
be reckless or wanton and can support a claim for punitive 
damages. Annotation 65 A.L.P.3d 656 (1979). Representative 
cases allowing punitive damages in a drunk driving case 
include: Smith v. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 
1977); Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 352 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. 1961); 
Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 147, 181 Cal. Rptr. 
784, 642 P.2d 1305 (Cal. 1983); Infield v. Sullivan, 199 
A.2d 693 (Conn. 1964); Butters v. Mince, 616 P.2d 127 (Colo. 
App. 1980); Walczak v. Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. 1971); 
Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1976); Calloway v. 
Rossman, 150 Ga. App. 381, 257 S.E.2d 913 (1979); Madison v. 
Wigal, 153 N.E.2d 90 (111. App. 1958); Sebastian v. Wood, 66 
N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1954); Hawkinson v. Geyer, 352 N.W.2d 784 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Moore v. Bothe, 479 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 
1972); Collins v. Black, 380 So.2d 241 (Miss. 1980); Allers 
v. Willis, 643 P.2d 592 (Mont. 1982); Svejcara v. Whitman, 
487 P.2d 167 (N.M. App. 1971); Huff v. Chrismn, 315 S.E.2d 
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711 (N.C. App. 1984); Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973); Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or. 
1973); Focht v. Rabada, 268 A.2d 157 (Pa. Super. 1970); 
Adams v. Hunter, 343 F. Supp. 1284 (D. S.C. 1972) afffd 471 
F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1973); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 
191 S.W. 2d 562 (1945); and Higgenbotham v. O'Keefe, 340 
S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). 
Legal commentators also advocate use of punitive 
damages in drunk driving cases. See Punitive Damages and 
The Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine L. Rev. 117 (1980); Note, 
Torts-Damages-The Drinking Driver and Punitive Damages, 7 
Wake Forest, L. Rev. 528 (1971) ; Comment, 46 Va. L. Rev. 
1036 (1960); Comment, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 645 (1961). 
The previously cited authorities overwhelmingly 
support a claim for punitive damages against a drunk driver. 
A complaint which states such a claim cannot be dismissed as 
a matter of law for failure to state a valid claim. 
III. ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING PUNITIVE 
DAMAGE CLAIMS REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES DECISION 
A. Where Punitive Damages are Allowed, 
Reckless or Wanton Activity is 
Sufficient Basis for an Award. 
The basic standard under which punitive damages 
are allowed includes the "legal malice" situation where a 
party manifests "a knowing and reckless indifference toward 
and disregard of, the rights of others." Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, §908, (1979); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah, 1983). Actual 
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intent to cause injury is not necessary. Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Ut. 1982). What is required 
is that the defendant must either know or should know "that 
such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result 
in substantial harm to another." Danculovich v. Brown, 593 
P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979) quoted with approval in Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., supra, at 1186-1187. 
It has been stated in most jurisdictions allowing 
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punitive damages that legal malice involving acts done in 
reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others 
permits an award of punitive damage. In addition to the 
jurisdictions cited earlier which have allowed punitive 
damages in the drunk driving situation, other jurisdictions 
which have included legal malice within the punitive damage 
standard include Alaska, Strum, Ruger & Co., Inc., 594 P. 2d 
38, 46 (Alaska. 1979), modified on other grounds 615 P.2d 
621 (1980) ; the District of Columbia, Riggs Nat'l Bank v. 
Punitive damages are not allowed at all in 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska and Washington. In 
Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan and New Hampshire, the 
purpose of punitive damages is partly compensatory. Stan-
dards in these jurisdictions include legal malice. Collens 
v. New Cannon Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 832 (Conn. 1967); 
General Refactories Co~v. Rogers, 239 S.E.2d 795, 796 (Ga. 
1977); Smith v. Jones, 169 N.W.2d 308, 319 (Mi. 1969). See 
generally Ghiardi and Kurcher, Punitive Damages, Law and 
Practice, §4.02 through §4.12. 
Price, 359 A.2d 25, 28 (D.C. App, 1976); Hawaii Goo v. 
Continental Casualty Co. , 473 P.2d 563, 566 (Ha. 1970); 
Idaho, Linscott v. Rainer Nat. Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958, 
962 (Id. 1980); Maryland, American Laundery Machinery 
Industries v. Horan, 412 A.2d 407 (Md. App. 1980); Kansas, 
Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp., 681 P.2d 
1038, 1061 (Kan. 1984); Maine, Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 
594 (Me. 1983) ; Missouri, Amish v. Walnut Creek Development, 
Inc. , 631 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App. 1982); North Dakota, N.D. 
Cent. Code §32-03-07 (1977 Supp.); Oklahoma, Weber v. Armco, 
Inc. , 663 P.2d 1221 (Ok. 1983); South Dakota, S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §21-3-2; Virgin Islands, Berroyer v. Hertz, 672 
F.2d 334 (3rd Cir. 1982); Wisconsin, Jeffers v. Nysse, 297 
N.E.2d 495 (Wi. 1980); and Wyoming, Danculovich v. Brown, 
593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979) . 
Allowing punitive damages in the drunk driving 
situation is but an application of the prevalent punitive 
damage standard which allows punitive damages in most 
situations where there is reckless indifference to the 
safety or rights of others. (See the authorities cited in 
Part II of this brief). 
B. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital 
Sets the Standard for Most Utah 
Punitive Damage Casels 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 
(Ut. 198 3) is a landmark case on punitive damages in Utah. 
The first Utah Supreme Court case involving a holding on the 
possibility of punitive damages in a negligence action, 
Behrens expressly held that legal malice consisting of 
reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others 
permitted punitive damages. The first Utah Supreme Court 
case actually having to decide whether punitive damages 
would be allowed in a wrongful death situation, Behrens also 
surprised many by its holding that punitive damages would be 
available in a wrongful death action. 
Defendants argued that Behrens was overruled by 
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Ut. 1984) 
which did not even mention Behrens. Most certainly the 
landmark Behrens case was not overruled sub silento by the 
false imprisonment McFarland case which was being considered 
at the same time that the Court was deciding Behrens and 
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which was decided only 5h weeks after Behrens. Behrens 
stands on its own merit independent of any single prior Utah 
case. Any reading of McFarland compels the conclusion that 
McFarland1s holding was limited to false imprisonment cases 
and that McFarland did not overrule settled law in other 
situations. 
1. McFarland was narrowly limited to false imprisonment 
cases. 
Even before Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Ut. 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
Behrens was decided on Dec. 22, 1983. McFarland 
was decided on February 1, 1984. 
had stated that punitive damages could be awarded in "legal 
malice" situations where "a conscious disregard of the 
rights of others and a reckless indifference to 
consequences" was present. Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Ut.2d 362, 
370-371, 267 P.2d 759, 765 (1954); Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Ut. 
295, 117 P.54, 57 (1911); see also Powers v. Taylor, 14 
Ut.2d 152, 155, 379 P.2d 380 (1963). Nevertheless, Terry, a 
false imprisonment case, appears to be the first Utah 
Supreme Court case where the ambiguities in the word 
"malice" were crucial to the actual holding on punitive 
damages. 
Terry held that malice in law "in a false 
imprisonment case" was enough to permit punitive damages. 
McFarland held that punitive damages would not be allowed 
"in a false imprisonment case" absent an actual showing of 
actual malice. Because Terry was the first Utah case 
actually having to hold that legal malice was enough to 
support a claim for punitive damages and was one of the 
authorities cited in Behrens, the district court ruled that 
Behrens had also been overruled even though Behrens and five 
other post-Terry cases stating that legal malice would be 
sufficient were never even mentioned in McFarland. However, 
McFarland is clearly limited to false imprisonment cases. 
Strongly influenced by a law review discussion 
entitled "False Imprisonment—Punitive Damages May Be 
Awarded as a Matter of Law", 1980 Utah L. Rev. 694, 
McFarland1s rationale was clearly limited to the peculiar 
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policy and legal questions faced in the shoplifting-false 
imprisonment dilema. The relied upon article pointed out 
that in most jurisdictions, proving the underlying false 
imprisonment tort required proof of an absence of probable 
cause. Theoretically, punitive damages would be awarded 
only if an absence of probable cause and bad faith existed, 
but the problem to a jury (or anyone else) is that the line 
between a person acting without probable cause but in good 
faith and detention without probable cause and in reckless 
bad faith is difficult to understand and determine. 
McFarland supra, at 303-304. Indeed, Terry itself held that 
malice could be implied from the lack of probable cause. 
(Id. at 303). 
The McFarland Court was concerned about this and 
the legislative intent to give merchants protection against 
unwarranted damage claims as expressed in legislation on the 
subject McFarland, supra at 303. Proving the underlying 
tort for all intents and purposes would prove entitlement to 
punitive damages even without Terry's explicit holding the 
could be the case. This did not seem to be something that 
was in tune with the public policy expressed by the legis-
lature. 
Significantly, the cases relied on in McFarland 
holding were all narrowly limited to false imprisonment 
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cases. McFarland, supra at 303 n.ll and at 304 n.14. Three 
of the four cases cited in Terry came from jurisdictions 
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which permit punitive damages in drunk driving situations. 
The language from Prosser on Torts, emphasized by the Court 
in McFarland evidenced the Court's overriding concern that a 
shopkeeper should not be punished for a "mere mistake." 
(McFarlandy supra at 804). Elsewhere in his treatise, 
Prosser cited drunk driving cases as authority for the rule 
"conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of 
others may be called willful or wanton" and supports a claim 
for punitive damages. Prosser, The Law of Torts, P.10 n.68 
(Fourth Ed., 1971) . 
Finally, the McFarland holding was expressly 
limited to false imprisonment cases. The Court expressed 
its decision in these words: 
. . . Accordingly, we adopt as the 
appropriate standard for determining the 
availability of a punitive damage award in an 
action for false imprisonment that of 'malice 
in fact' or 'actual malice.' 678 P.2d at 304 
[Emphasis added.] 
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Compare the drunk driving case of Butters v. 
Mince, 616 P. 2d 127 (Colo. 1980) with the cited false 
imprisonment case Gilmer v. Playboy Club of Denver, Inc., 
513 P.2d 1065 (Colo. App. 1973); the drunk driving case of 
Collingan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) 
with the false imprisonment case Guion v. Associated Dry 
Good Corp. Etc. , 393 N.Y.S.2d 8 (App. Div. 1977); and the 
false imprisonment case of Consolidated Sales Co. v. Malone, 
530 S.W.2d 680 (1975) with the drunk driving case of Moore 
v. Bothe, 479 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1972) and the basic standard 
of punitive damages in Kentucky set forth in Harrold v. 
Fraley, 289 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1956). 
Defendant in that McFarland did not argue for a 
broader rule (Id. at 303) . McFarland did not discuss 
punitive damages in the broader context and did not even 
mention any of the six post-Terry decisions stating legal 
malice to be sufficient or the two pre-Terry cases. 
2. Behrens stands on its merit. 
Terry was not the only authority cited in Behrens. 
The Court also relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§908 (1979) which expressed the rule allowing punitive 
damages where legal malice is present, which rule has been 
adopted by most jurisdictions which 
allow punitive damages. Behrens relied on numerous out-
of-state cases, a host of scholarly opinions, and other 
authorities as well. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., supra 
at 1183-1187 (Utah, 1983). 
Further, Behrens finds support in pre-Terry dicta 
in Wilson v. Oldroyd, 267 P.2d 759, (Ut. 1954) and Rugg v. 
Tolman, 117 p.54, 57 (1911). 
Any decision limiting punitive damages to actual 
malice cases would effectively eliminate punitive damages 
from everything but intentional tort cases. In addition to 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 
1179 (Ut. 1983) ; Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 
P.2d 293 (Ut. 1982); Branch v. Western Petoleum, Inc., 657 
P.2d 267 (Ut. 1982); Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 
655 P.2d 1125 (Ut. 1982); First Sec. Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. 
Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 (Ut. 1982); Elkington v. Foust, "6T8 
P.2d 37 (Ut. 1980) . 
drunk driving and other situations where reckless disregard 
of the rights or safety of others should be deterred and 
punished, it would effectively eliminate punitive damage 
from product liability actions where punitive damages can 
affect potentially dangerous corporate decisions. 
As stated in Rogensky v„ Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 
378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d. Cir. 1967) and quoted in Hawkinson v. 
Geyer, 352 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Minn. 1984). 
From a moral standpoint there is not too much 
difference between the driver who heads his 
car into a plaintiff and the driver who takes 
the wheel knowing himself to be so drunk that 
he probably will hit someone and not caring 
whether he does or not; and it is as impor-
tant to deter the later type of conduct as 
the former. 
Distinguishing between those who intentionally 
cause an intended harm and those whose behavior is not 
directed at any individual but nevertheless evidences a 
reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others 
creates too wide a gap in areas where public policy demands 
stricter adherence to moral responsibilities. 
Even when the underlying theory is strict 
liability, the nearly unanimous rule followed in 
products liability cases allows punitive damages if the 
defendant's conduct warrants it. e.g. Vossler v. 
Richards Manufacturing Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 952, 192 
Cal. Rptr. 219 (1983); Benefield v. Aquaslide ' nf Dive 
Corp., 406 So.2d 863 (Ala. 1981); Forrest City Machine 
Works, Inc. v. Adenhald, 616 S.W.2d 720 (Ark. 1981); 
American Laundry Mach. Ind. v. Horan, 412 A.2d 407 (Md. 
App. 1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 
(Wi. 1980); Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 
38, (Alaska 1979) reh. "615 P.2d 621 (1980); Rinker v. 
Ford Motor Co. , 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1978); Vollert v. 
Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1350 (D.Ha. 1975); Hoffman v. 
Sterling Drag, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Penn. 
T 4"7 A \ .—' 
3. Behrens has been recently reaffirmed. 
The foregoing discussion should be dispositive on 
the effect of McFarland and Behrens, If any doubt remains, 
it is quashed by the even more recent Utah Supreme Court 
decision of Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 12 
Utah Adv. Rpt. 15 (Ut. 1985) . That case expressly 
reaffirmed Behrens and the legal malice standard. Citing 
Behrens, the court said: 
Punitive damages among other things, punish 
conduct which manifests a knowing or reckless 
indifference towards, and disregard of, the 
rights of others. 
(Id. at 19). 
C. The Appropriateness of Punitive 
Damages is a Question of Fact. 
At this stage, plaintiff's allegations concerning 
intoxication and running a stop sign must be taken in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Despain v. Despain, 
682 P.2d 849 (Utah 1984); Allred v. Cook, 540 P.2d 318 (Ut. 
1979). The issue of whether the punitive damages standard 
is met is a jury question. Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 
(Ut. 1980) . Whether drunk driving in a particular situation 
is "reckless indifference to the rights or safety of others" 
is at least a jury question. Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
Comment d (1979); Smith v. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900 (Ariz. 
1977); Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or. 1973); Madison v. 
Wigal, 18 111. App. 2d 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (1958). 
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The trial court's ruling was based on the misper-
ception that Utah law requires "malice in fact" for any 
award of punitive damages. (R. 149-154) That decision was 
wrong. Because the issue of whether the right punitive 
damage standard is met is a fact question, it would be just 
as wrong to uphold the decision on any alternative basis. 
IV. THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT IT 
WAS REQUIRED TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR AGGRAVATION 
The Jury Instruction No. 11 given by the trial 
court did not tell the jury that it had to award damages for 
any aggravation of plaintiff's pre-existing condition. 
Instead, after informing the jury in no uncertain terms that 
they could not award anything for the pre-existing condi-
tion, the relevant instruction simply stated that any 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition "should be con-
sidered . . . in determining general damages." (R. 17). 
This unclear direction could easily have been interpreted as 
leaving the decision of whether to award general damages at 
all for aggravation up to the jury's discretion even if it 
found that the pre-existing condition had been aggravated. 
To be sure, the amount of general damages to be 
awarded is something which is basically left to the fact 
finder's good judgment. But the decision to award some 
damages is not. It is well established that where an injury 
causing pain or disability occurs, there must be at least 
some award of general damages. American States Insurance Co 
v, Audobon County Club, 650 S.W.2d 252, 254-255 (Ky. 1983); 
22 
Hammond v. Estate of Rimmer, 643 S-.W.2d 222 (Tex. App. 
1982); Robertson v. Stanley, 206 S.E.2d 190 (N.C. 1974); 
Cooper v. Christenson, 185 N.W.2d 97 (Mich App. 1971); 
Pickel v. Rosen, 214 So.2d 730 (Fla. App. 1968); Massey v. 
Stephens, 150 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. App. 1966); DeWitty V. Decker, 
383 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 1963); Dunn v. Eisley, 151 So.2d 791 
(Ala. App. 1963); Murrow v. Whiteley, 244 P.2d 657 (Colo. 
1952) . If the jury believed that some aggravation of the 
pre-existing condition occurred, it was required to award 
something for that aggravation. 
An erroneous instruction is presumptively harmful 
and is grounds for reversal unless it affirmatively appears 
from the record as a whole that the jury was not misled. 
Turner v. Willis, 582 P.2d 710, 715 (Ha. 1978). Where it 
seems probable that the jury's verdict may have been based 
on an erroneous instruction, prejudice appears, and the 
appellate court will not speculate on the basis of teh 
verdict but will reverse. Luque v. McLean, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
443, 8 Cal 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 1170 (1972). A party is 
entitled to present a case to a jury under instructions that 
"clearly, concisely and accurately" state the applicable 
law. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564, 566 
(1960) . Reversal is required where "there is a reasonable 
likelihood to believe" that a more favorable result would 
have occurred without the erroneous instruction. Rowley v. 
Graven Brothers & Company, 26 Ut. 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209, 
1211 (1971) . An ambiguous instruction capable of being 
interpreted as a correct or as an incorrect statement of the 
lay is just as vulnerable to attack on appeal as an 
unambiguously incorrect statement. Fairbrother v. Rinker, 
547 P.2d 605, 607 (Or. 1976). 
The damages plaintiff complained of were 
significant enough to support a verdict of $20,000 or more, 
but the general damages awarded were only $500. The $500.00 
figure could well have come from the collateral bruises and 
bumps which accompany most any accident and may not have 
involved any consideration of any aggravation. The trial 
court should have instructed the jury clearly and 
unambiguously on the issue, especially after being so 
forceful on the inability to recover for the pre-existing 
"condition." 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON AGGRAVATION 
PREVENTED PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING HER 
THEORY ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FROM BEING 
CONSIDERED BY THE JURY. 
A. A Defendant Who Caused an Asymp-
tomatic Condition to Become 
Disabling is Liable for the Entire 
Disability 
It is important to distinguish between two very 
different medical situations. 
In the first, a person has some pre-existing 
physical abnormality or "condition" which exists but causes 
no pain or other "disability." When a person is injured in 
an accident, the underlying "condition" may become symptoma-
tic, causing disability. Case authorities often use the 
term "lighting up" or "lit up" to describe a situation where 
a dormant and asymptomatic "condition" becomes painful or 
otherwise causes "disability" after an accident. (See e.g. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 461 - Illustrations 
to Comment a) . 
In the second kind of situation there is a pre-
existing "condition" which causes pain or some other 
"disability" even before the accident occurs. When the 
accident occurs, the pain increases or the victim is other-
wise further "disabled". This is the classic "aggravation" 
case. 
The law distinguishes between the two types of 
situations. In the first situation, where an injury causes 
a pre-existing, asymptomatic condition to "light up", and 
the "condition" becomes painful or "disabling" as a result 
of the accident, the courts consistently hold the defendant 
liable for the entire "disability" or damages which result. 
22 Am Jur. 2d "Damages" §123; Frumer and Fredman, Personal 
Injury, Actions-Defenses-Damages, Vol. 3 "Damages" §6.01 
(1984 Ed.); Becker v. D&E Distributing Co., 247 N.W.2d 727, 
731 (Iowa, 1976); Steinhauser v. Hertz Corporation, 421 F.2d 
1169 (2d Cir. 1970) (applying New York law); Bennett v. 
Messick, 457 P.2d 609, 612 (Wash. 1969); Holt v. McCann, 429 
S.W.2d 441, 444-445 (Tenn. App. 1968); Owen v. Dix, 196 
S.W.2d 913(Ark. 1946); Hamlen, Inc. v. Owens, 172 So. 694, 
696 (Fla. 1937); Jones v. City of Caldwell, 116 P. 110 (Id. 
1911) overruled on other grounds 175 p.588 (1918). See 
also, Restatement (Second) of Torts §461, Comment a, 
Illustrations 1 and 2. 
In the second situation where pain experienced 
before the accident is increased or where "disability" 
existing before is increased, the classic rule that the 
defendant is liable for the aggravation or the increase in 
pain or disability only is followed. 
But the rule to be applied where a dormant, 
latent, or asymptomatic condition becomes painful or dis-
abling as a result of an accident is clearly stated by the 
Washington Supreme Court in these words: 
The rule is that when a latent condition 
itself does not cause pain, suffering or a 
disability, but that condition plus an injury 
brings on pain or disability by aggravating 
the pre-existing condition and making it 
active, . . . the party at fault is held for 
the entire damage." 
Bennett v. Messick, 457 P.2d 609 (Wash, 
1969). 
B. Utah Follows the General Rule 
Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d 451 (Ut. 1966), was a 
case which involved a pre-existing arthritic condition which 
was arguably asymptomatic prior to the accident. The trial 
court in Brunson instructed the jury that the plaintiff 
could not recover for any pre-existing "condition" but that 
she could recover for aggravation of a pre-existing 
"disability." (Id. at 452). 
Evidently, the plaintiff in that case did not 
complain about any failure of the trial court to give an 
instruction specifically stating that defendant would be 
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liable for all plaintiff's damages if it found that the 
pre-existing "condition" was asymptomatic prior to the 
accident. Rather, the plaintiff simply argued that the 
court erred in using the terms "disability" and "condition" 
interchangeably• (Id.) 
The court acknowledged that the terms were 
synonymous "only in a limited sense" but held that under the 
totality of the circumstances, any error was not prejudi-
cial. Following that conclusion, the court stated that 
while a victim could not recover for a "pre-existing condi-
tion" as such or for a "pre-existing disability", an injured 
party could recover for "any aggravation or lighting up" of 
a pre-existing condition. (Id. at 453). 
The court also acknowledged the validity of the 
"thin skull" rule which states that the tortfeasor takes the 
victim as he finds him and is responsible for all damages 
resulting even if the victim has some unknown predisposition 
to suffer a greater amount of damages than what one would 
ordinarily expect. 
Analytically, the rule that a tortfeasor is liable 
for the full disability when his actions "light up" a 
previously dormant, asymptomatic "condition" is but a 
special application of the broader rule that a tortfeasor 
takes his victim as he finds him. It is significant that 
the Restatement uses situations where an asymptomatic 
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pre-existing condition becomes symptomatic to illustrate the 
application of the "thin skull" rule. Illustrations 1 and 2 
to Restatement (Second) of Torts §461 read as follows: 
1. Through the motorman's negligent 
management of the A Company's trolley car the 
control lever strikes the breast of B, a 
passsenger. The injury is apparently slight, 
but is causes a cancerous tendency to "light 
up" and localize itself in the injured point, 
requiring the amputation of B's breast. A is 
answerable for the harm caused by the cancer 
and the amputation. 
2. A, a schoolboy, during school 
hours, inflicts a slight kick upon the shin 
of B, a fellow student. Ordinarily the kick 
would have caused only a slight sensation of 
pain, but because of a latent infection it 
has serious consequences. A is subject to 
liability to B for the full extent of his 
injuries. 
C. The Court's Refusal to Give Plain-
tiff 
Was 
's Requested 
Prejudicial 
eluded Plaintiff 
Instruction No 
Because It 
's Theorv of 
. i i 
Pre-
the 
Case. 
Where there is evidence to support a party's 
theory of the case, it is prejudicial error not to give a 
requested instruction which covers that theory. Waters v. 
Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Ut. 1981); Elkington v. Foust, 618 
P.2d 37 (Ut. 1980); 75 Am. Jr. 2d "Trial" §653. Although 
the evidence was disputed, evidence existed which could have 
supported a finding that plaintiff's lower back was asympto-
matic prior to the accident and became symptomatic only 
because of the accident. (e.g. R. 523, 528, 547, 566, 572, 
573, 574). Plaintiff's requested jury instruction No. 11 
which sets forth this theory should have been given. 
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The trial court's instruction reads as follows: 
You are instructed that the damages that 
may be assessed in this case should not be 
reduced simply because the plaintiff may 
suffer from a pre-existing or abnormal 
condition. If you find that the plaintiff 
suffers from an abnormal or pre-existing 
condition which has not been proximately 
caused by the accident, even though it may 
invite your sympathy, you may not assess any 
damage against the defendant for that condi-
tion. However, if the accident has been a 
proximate cause of aggravating such pre-
existing or abnormal condition, that should 
be considered by you in determining general 
damages. (R.305). 
As a statement of the rule that the defendant 
would be liable for the entire damages which she caused if 
it found the pre-existing condition to asymptomatic prior to 
the accident, it was totally inadequate. It did not give 
the jury the slightest inkling that it could award plaintiff 
damages for her entire disability if it found that the 
accident "lit up" or "activated" the pre-existing condition. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court clearly errored in dismissing 
plaintiff's punitive damage claim as a matter of law. Drunk 
driving is such a significant evil that a jury ought to at 
least be able to consider punitive damages in such situa-
tions. The case should be remanded for a trial on the 
punitive damage claim. 
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With respect to the compensatory damage issue, 
plaintiff was entitled to have its theory of the case 
presented to the jury. She was also entitled to have the 
jury clearly instructed on its duty to award damages. The 
trial court's instruction was misleading and precluded it 
from considering plaintiff's theory of the case. The 
compensatory damage issue should be remanded for a new 
trial. 
DATED this / 7 ^ day of ftr£. , 
1985. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
By:
 ST^%^^ ^rf^/4<smr^ 
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remember ] 
Q 
Deing hurt there. 
After the dust settled, and you got out, how 
did you feel? 
A 
moved the 
there wail 
left side 
Q 
A 
Until — after we moved — well, we finally 
cars across the street. And when I was standing 
ting for the police my back started aching and my 
Was it a big ache? 
I was just hurting standing there. I felt very 
uncomfortable. 
Q 
A 
of August 
Q 
A 
third day 
Q 
A 
I was off 
Q 
A 
helper in 
Q 
A 
Q 
When did you first go to the doctor? 
I went on Monday after the accident, on the 25th 
• 
And that was how many days after the accident? 
It was Friday night, Saturday, Sunday, Monday — 
• 
Why did you wait until Monday to go to the doctor? 
I had to work Saturday and I worked Sunday, and 
Monday, and so I went to the doctor. 
Who is the doctor you went to? 
Actually I seen a Jan Johnson, who is a physician's 
the Southwest Medical Clinic. 
And Jan Johnson is the helper who — 
Dr. Brasher. 
In addition to Dr. Brasher, Ifd like you to list 
90i 
.. <r* * *L 
1 Before August of '81. Before August of '81, did you ever 
2 have any backaches? 
3 A I was working at the cannery — my back used to 
4 work from lifting those No, 10 cans, but it would be right 
5 up through here — my shoulders and back. And Ifve had a 
6 lot of bladder infections, so I!ve had a lot of backaches 
7 with that. And I've had a hysterectomy, and backaches 
8 from that. But it's not this kind of ache. 
9 Q How many operations have you had? 
10 'A I've had a couple of breast surgeries, and a 
11 bladder repair, and a hysterectomy, appendicitis, tonsils. 
12 That might cover all of them. 
13 Q You said earlier that you had gone to see the 
14 first doctor. Was that Dr. Brasherfs office? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And his helper was Jan Johnson? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And you mentioned you went in three or four times. 
19 When you went in to see Dr. Jan Johnson, were you always 
20 alone, or did you — 
21 A No. Usually when I went to see Dr. Johnson I 
22 was taking one of my kids — before work I had to hurry and 
23 get to work. If the kids needed to be taken to the doctor, 
24 I took them real quick and dropped them at school and went 
25 to work. 
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1 infection, you'll have a pain in your back. But itfs a 
2 different spot. Itfs more like across. 
3 Q And then on April of 1981, do you remember going in 
4 and talking to Mr. Johnson, or whoever you saw on that day, 
5 and telling them that you had some aching in your left leg 
6 for the last six months? 
7 A I remember telling Jan I had some aching in my 
8 leg for about three days that wouldn't stop, and I wondered 
9 about it. 
10 Q Okay. And he was just going to sort of let you 
H watch it and see what happened? 
12 A He told me to take a couple of aspirins, and see 
13 if that helped. And I did for a couple of days, and I 
14 don't remember having it again. 
15 Q And then you're in for a urinary tract infection 
16 on May 29th, 1981. Does that sound about right? 
17 A I've had a lot of infections. 
18 Q And on June 12th, 1981, which is less than a 
19 month later, you remember reporting to Mr. Johnson that you 
20 were still having back and abdominal pain? 
21 A That's from the urinary infection. 
22 Q And that's in the back? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And then again before this accident on July 3, 
25 1981, you consulted with Mr. Johnson, or somebody at that 
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took after Harold and 
Q Okay. Now 
Harold was gone, and 
taking tranquilizers, 
A 
i That1s a 
Q 
1 A 
right — 
Q 
A 
[ I separated in 1981. 
in that time you were depressed, < and 
you had family problems, and you were 
was your back hurting? 
No, other than when I had bladder infections 
different kind of pain. 
Explain hov. 
The pain I 
Stand up. 
There is a 
this pain — any time 
pains, and sometimes 
the knee 
Q 
A 
straight 
then my : 
Q 
accident 
A 
Q 
weren't 
Why didn 
see Jan v 
r it's different. 
have now is on my left side, and . 
Turn around and show the jury. 
lump right here, and that's where 
there is pain. Sometimes it's si 
itfs just pain that radiates down 
r and other times it will go numb. 
Where does 
When I have 
across like 
female organs 
Now, there 
and you were 
Yes. 
it hurt? 
a bladder infection it's usually 
this, like where the kidneys are, 
> will feel pressure. 
• 
it's 
I feel 
larp 
to 
and 
were some questions about after the 
\ back to see Jan Johnson. 
And sometimes you talked about your back and 
sure whether 
you 
other times you mentioned your back. 
1t you mention your back pain every time you went to 
Johnson? 
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except for moving furniture about, and felt like she could 
perform most anything except that, and bowling more than 
one game. 
Q And then as itfs discussed in the last line of 
your report on the history, was there some discussion about 
her exercise, or recreation? 
A She wasn't on any special exercise program, or any 
treatment program. 
Q Now, Doctor, I provided you with medical records 
of Mrs. Biswell in addition to x-rays; is that correct? 
A That1s right. 
Q And as a part of your review for this case, you 
examined some of the medical records? 
A Thatfs correct. 
Q Referring to your summary of the record review, 
and I hope we can take this rather quickly, I just want you 
to highlight for me some prior medical records that you 
reviewed beginning with the clinic note of Dr. Brasher. 
A Well, in June of that year, 1981, she was having 
problems with abdominal pain and urinary tract infection, 
and having some back pain. And this was treated with some 
antibiotics. Do you want me to go through that whole 
record? 
Q Ifd like you to now talk about the next record in 
Dr. Brasherfs report, yes. 
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1 A August 25th, 1981? 
2 Q Right. 
3 A She was having then some back pain following an 
4 automobile accident four days earlier. He records that she 
5 didn't describe any pain at the time of the accident, but 
6 was now having pain in the lower back area, and down the 
7 left side to the knee. 
8 Q What about the tests that were performed? 
9 A He didn't find any evidence of any neurological 
10 injury, or any irritation of the nerve. 
H Q Why is that significant? 
12 A It just indicates that her injuries were more of a 
13 muscle, or ligamentous type, and not related to, for example 
14 a disk injury. 
15 Q And then going down to — through Dr. Brasher!s 
15 records, let me try to carry you through this quickly. She 
17 was seen again on September 1, and you reviewed that record, 
18 and she continues to complain of back pain, and shoulder 
19 pain. And then there is a note that I understand you 
20 reviewed of September 4th; is that correct? 
21 A That1 s right. 
22 Q What did that reveal? 
23 A Dr. Brasher described that her back pain was 
24 getting better, and he took x-rays of the neck, and dorsal 
25 spine, and lumbar spine, and these were interpreted as normal 
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1 Q And then when was the next entry? 
2 A Four days later. 
3 Q What was that for? 
4 A She presented at that time for urinary tract 
5 infection. At that point there is no mention of any back 
6 pain in that record. 
7 Q And then based on your review of the record, when 
8 is the next time that she!s in to see Dr. Brasher? 
9 A She came in again in November of '81. 
10 Q Is that November 30th to be exact? 
11 A Right, November 30th of f81. Right. 
12 i Q Was there any back pain described in that report? 
13 A No mention there. Just lower abdominal pain, 
14 and no back pain is recorded. 
15 Q And then onto page three of your report, the 
16 clinic note that it next appears in Dr. Brasher!s records 
17 was on January 30th; is that right? 
18 A January 30th, 1982, right. 
19 Q This is the first time since September 4th that 
20 she is describing back pain; is that right? 
21 A Right. This time she is describing the pain 
22 radiating down her right leg. 
23 Q Which is different than what she had said before? 
24 A Yeah. Earlier it had been down the left leg. 
25 Q And was there a neurologic examination on that day? 
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1
 Q Doctor, what Ifd like you to do is to take this 
2 exhibit and explain with the use of this exhibit to the jury 
3 why donft you come down here. Explain the use of this 
4
 exhibit — what the degenerative disk disease refers to. 
5 A All right. What we're looking at here is the 
6 lumbar spine from the side. And the blue, or what's referred] 
7 to as the disk of the bones of the skeleton in between are 
8 the vertebral bodies. And what happens in the degenerative 
9 process with age is in all of us is what's happening in 
10 the patient here is that the disk loses volume because of 
11 loss of water. And as that occurs, there begins to be a 
12 little more motion between the vertebrae as though you had 
13 an orange tied between two cans, and you deflated the orange, 
14 or else took it out, then the ligaments that would be tying 
15 together those two cans together would be relatively loose. 
16 And the body in attempting to repair that situation develops 
17 some spurring called in this situation — called a traction 
18 spur. Her back is undergoing this degenerative change. When| 
19 that happens, there is not only changes here, but subtle 
20 changes in the joints where these bones touch each other. 
21 The joints no longer match up well, where initially they 
22 were designed to be symmetrical one with each other. The 
23 bodies come together, they tend to slide, kind oi like a 
24 car door — it doesn't close very well if it's been banged 
25 or dinged in some way. And that's what happens to the 
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Presidential Commission 
on Dr1 j ik Dri - ing 
l h e New Hope of Solutiutt 
The public is united in demanding solutions—no one is in 
favor of drunk driving, not even drunk drivers. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
W A S H I N G T O N 
TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
Over the past ten years, 250,000 Americans have died in 
accidents caused by drunk driving, and millions have been 
maimed or crippled. Unless greater efforts are made to 
combat this problem, the best estimates tell us that these 
figures will recur over the next decade* 
We must not allow this to happen. The Presidential 
Commission on Drunk Driving, which I appointed on April 14, 
1982, has devoted eighteen months to an exhaustive study of 
this problem. The Commission has held a total of 100 hours 
of hearings in eight cities around the country. Chairman 
John Volpe and his colleagues have listened to the experts: 
the medical people, the law enforcement officials, and other 
authorities in this field. They have also heard the 
heart-breaking testimony of the victims: the bereaved and 
the permanently disabled. Most important of all, they have 
developed many new constructive proposals to help us get 
drunk drivers off the road. 
I am proud of the great work the Commission has 
accomplished. I salute Chairman Volpe and the other members 
of the Commission for their dedication and tireless effort. 
I commend this Final Report, the product of their many 
labors, to you, the American people. 
Drunk driving is a national menace, a national tragedy, 
and a national disgrace. It is my fervent hope that this 
report will receive the attention it deserves, and that it 
will speed the adoption of whatever measures are appropriate 
to remove this hazard from our national life. 
Sincerely, 
3waJ&» I CBLM^V^ 
Presidential Commission 
on n •••'• '>- ing 
Dear Mr. President: 
ii is .-.* pleasure and a sense of accomplishment that I submit to you 
the Final Report, of the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving. The Com-
mission members that you appointed have worked with great enthusiasm and 
commitment to determine how best to reduce the death and destruction on our 
highways caused by drunk drivers, 
At eight hearings across the country, we listened with sorrow and anger to 
parents, friends and relatives of victims as well as to disabled victims 
themselves. We shared their anger as they expressed frustration with laws 
and courts that failed to punish those guilty of what for too long has been 
a socially acceptable crime. In addition, we heard testimony from various 
governmental sectors—the legislature, judiciary, and law enforcement offi-
cials—as well as other expert witnesses. 
Like those who testified, we are convinced that more should be done. 
Responding to your charge, the Commission has completed its work, making 
recommendations that it feels will help reduce the carnage on our highways 
caused by those who combine drinking and driving. Long-term education and 
prevention efforts, with private sector involvement, are particularly key to 
our success in combatting drunk driving. As individuals, we will continue 
to voice our concern, working with citizen groups and encouraging legislatures 
in every State to approve legislation based on our recommendations. In addi-
tion, as recommended by the Commission, a private sector group affiliated 
with the National Safety Council will monitor progress on the Commission's 
recommendation- * •. • *r\ r-^ .- ^ - they are carried out. 
In submitting :;,;s report, . .- ...eased to inform you that highway fatalities 
in 1982 were 5,580 less than in 1981, which means about 2,800 of our citizens 
were not the victims of alcohol-related tragedy, Oris marked the largest 
single-year downturn in highway deaths in 40 years, with the exception of 
the oil embargo year of 1974. No one agency or group can take the credit 
for this encouraging decrease. It is truly an accomplishment of all Ameri-
cans. Nonetheless, I feel the Commission did serve as a catalyst for this 
bipartisan safety campaign 
I appreciate this opportunity to again serve our nation, as do other members 
of the Commission. Each of them has my deepest gratitude for his or her 
generous contribution of time, talent, in! expertise. Without their unselfish 
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The Presidential Commission On Drunk Driving 
Final Report 
Introduction 
The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving 
was charged with a most important and far-
reaching task: to encourage State and local 
governments, as well as the private sector, to im-
plement programs that will reduce the carnage 
caused by the drinking driver on our highways. 
This task is not an easy one. In fact, to reach this 
goal the Commission's recommendations must go 
far beyond the highway environment to the heart 
of the problem—society's values, attitudes, and 
behaviors regarding the use, and abuse, of alcohol. 
Past Efforts 
This nation has tried in the past to combat drunk 
driving. Millions of dollars have been spent by all 
segments of American society. These efforts have 
applied new and improved technology, procedures, 
and laws to reduce driving under the influence. 
Information programs and limited health and 
educational efforts have been a part of these 
undertakings, but few have been carried out on a 
comprehensive sustained basis. 
In some cases, these past efforts have shown 
short-term success; in others, the impact was not 
noticeable. For example, between 1970 and 1976 
the Department of Transportation and the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
conducted the Alcohol Safety Action Program, 
which had some measure of success, but the efforts 
were not uniformly sustained. Alcohol-impaired 
driving continues to be a serious public health and 
safety problem. It is the number one killer of young 
people in this nation. 
The Drunk Driving Problem Today 
At least 50 percent of all highway deaths involve 
the irresponsible use of alcohol. Over the past 10 
years, 250,000 Americans have tragically lost their 
lives in alcohol-related crashes. Conservative 
estimates place the annual economic loss at $21 
billion, while others run as high as $24 billion. 
There is, of course, no way to measure the loss of 
human lives. 
In single vehicle fatal crashes, for which fault 
can be more easily ascertained than in multiple 
vehicle crashes, upwards of 65 percent of those 
drivers who died were legally under the influence, 
i.e., their alcohol level was above 0.10. Further-
more, more than half of the drunk drivers who 
were involved in fatal crashes had blood alcohol 
concentrations (BACs) twice that of the legal limit. 
The average BAC of these drunk drivers was 0.20. 
These figures suggest that the majority of al-
cohol-related fatal crashes is caused by heavy 
(problem) drinkers. This is not to say that less 
heavy, less chronic, " social'' drinkers are not in-
volved—they are—but it is the individual who reg-
ularly abuses alcohol who appears to be most often 
involved in alcohol-related fatal crashes. 
This becomes even more significant in light of 
the fact that only one in five hundred (1/500) to 
one in two thousand (1/2,000) drivers on the road 
with a BAC greater than 0.10 are arrested for driv-
ing under the influence. The low likelihood of ar-
rest, and a lenient judicial attitude fostered by a 
misperception of the seriousness of the offense, 
are important factors in perpetuating this nation's 
drunk driving problem. 
An even more pervasive problem is the social ac-
ceptability of intoxication and drunk driving. In a 
society where mass transportation is underdevel-
oped and underutilized, the person who drinks at a 
party or a commercial establishment will most 
likely be a driver or passenger in an automobile. 
Americans are uncomfortable with those who over-
drink, but by and large do not feel it is their respon-
sibility—or even their right—to prevent intoxica-
tion among the members of their own social circles. 
In addition, Americans have a long tradition of 
laughing at "funny drunks" in the movies, on the 
stage, and in their own social circles—constituting 
a tacit, albeit uncomfortable, societal O.K. to 
drunkenness. The combination of the social accept-
ance of intoxication and the omnipresence of the 
individual passenger car adds up to the continued 
social acceptability of drunk driving. 
The New Hope of Solution 
In the past two years, society has reacted to the 
drunk driving problem in ways it had not in the 
past. A number of citizen action groups have 
brought the problem of alcohol-related tragedies to 
the attention of the public and to officials at the 
local, State, and Federal levels. The Presidential 
Commission was the culmination of a crescendo of 
voices—voices of victims and their families—which 
demanded action. The demand for action is not 
new, but its intensity and extent have never been 
more dramatic. Such a national outcry presents an 
enormous opportunity and yet an enormous 
danger. 
The enormous opportunity arises from the fact 
that the public is united in demanding solu-
tions—no one is in favor of drunk driving, not even 
drunk drivers. For example, within the last year, 
39 States have enacted improved legislation, and 
41 States have established task forces or Commis-
sions to examine the problem, to identify system 
deficiencies, and to recommend solutions. The 
media have become actively involved in supporting 
and publicizing improvements in the system. 
Legislators, enforcement officials, prosecutors, 
and judges around the country have responded to 
society's demands by enacting more effective 
legislation, apprehending more offenders, effec-
tively prosecuting offenders, and meting out more 
appropriate sanctions. 
The enormous danger lies in the possibility that 
these necessary changes will be mistaken for the 
ultimate solution to the problem. ^ :lone, most legal 
and judicial changes will bring about no more than 
short-term solutions to the^ dj-unk driving problem. 
If we propose only such short-term responses, we 
may mislead the American public into believing 
that a few changes in law and administration will 
make the difference, and thereby squander the 
public confidence which is our most important ally. 
Laws alone will not dramatically change the drunk 
driving problem. The individual and society, as a 
whole, must be active partners in this effort if we 
are to see changes over the long haul that will be 
sustained by future generations. Society has 
shown itself to be willing; we must provide long-
term leadership and innovative solutions. 
The Commission's Blueprint for Change 
In its deliberations and recommendations, the 
Commission has kept in mind both the great oppor-
tunity and the great danger. Our recommendations 
recognize the unique role that the individual, the 
society within which we live, and social institutions 
must play in changing behavior in order to reduce 
the carnage caused by driving under the influence. 
The most important recommendations deal with 
the need for grassroots citizen action, the creation 
of State and local task forces, the establishment of 
self-funding means, and the involvement of the 
private sector in long-term educational .efforts. 
We have tried to learn from past attempts, which 
have not been entirely successful, and tried to 
recognize the immense competition for the public's 
attention by many important social problems. We 
seek support for our recommendations on the basis 
of a comprehensive, realistic evaluation of what 
must be done and by whom if drunk driving is to be 
reduced in this nation. 
The Commission believes that public officials at 
all levels of government must take action to 
eliminate or reduce the public health hazard of 
driving under the influence and should be primarily 
responsible for assuring legal and judicial inno-
vation and program implementation. The Commis-
sion's recommendations in the areas of enforce-
ment, prosecution, adjudication, licensing 
administration, alcoholic beverage regulation, 
systems support, and education and treatment 
represent a coherent, comprehensive program to 
serve as a baseline of public, official response to 
the problem. Prompt adoption of these recommen-
dations will assure that the criminal justice system 
works swiftly and fairly to deter where possible 
and to treat and/or punish where necessary. 
The Commission wishes to stress, however, that 
prevention is the only long-term remedy for the 
driving-under-the-influence problem. We are cur-
rently in the most fertile environment to under-
take innovative educational efforts to prevent 
drunk driving. Past prevention campaigns had to 
begin by building public awareness of the drunk 
driving problem. Today, however, the general 
public's level of awareness of the drunk driving 
problem is already high, thanks to the efforts of 
grassroots citizens groups and enlightened public 
leaders. This high level of awareness implies that 
the public is ready for the next step: educational 
efforts that tell them how to prevent intoxication 
and drunk driving in their own social circles. 
Such comprehensive, innovative efforts are con-
tained in the Commission's recommendations con-
cerning Public Awareness, Public Education, and 
the Private Sector. The program outlined in these 
recommendations must be sustained for at least a 
decade and must make use of every channel of 
communication in the home, in the work place, in 
voluntary associations, in educational institutions, 
and in the community to reach the widest possible 
audience with the message that drunkenness and 
drunk driving are socially unacceptable and that 
each of us has the responsibility and the right to 
sustain an environment in which such dangerous 
practices will not be tolerated. 
The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving 
issues this report as a challenge to the nation to 
take action. We believe that the solution to drunk 
driving lies within the power of each American 
who chooses to support and act on the Commis-
sion's recommendations. 
The Commission's Charge 
President Reagan established "The Presidential 
Commission on Drunk Driving'' by Executive 
Order No. 12358, on April 14, 1982. The functions 
of the Commission were to: 
• Heighten public awareness of the seriousness 
of the drunk driving problem; 
• Persuade States and communities to attack 
the drunk driving problem in a more organized 
and systematic manner, including developing 
plans to eliminate bottlenecks in the arrest, 
trial, and sentencing process that impair the 
effectiveness of many drunk driving laws; 
• Encourage State and local officials and 
organizations to accept and use the latest 
techniques and methods to solve the problem; 
and 
• Generate public support for increased enforce-
ment of State and local drunk driving laws. 
To accomplish these functions, the Commission 
established the following goals: 
• To encourage all governors, county ex-
ecutives, and mayors to form task forces to ex-
amine their drunk driving control systems, to 
develop solutions to problems, to increase 
public awareness, and to develop plans for the 
future. 
• To recommend improvements in the areas of 
education and prevention, enforcement and 
adjudication, and executive and legislative 
leadership. 
• To act as spokesman on the issufe in order to 
heighten public awareness, and to encourage 
others to take action to help resolve the 
problem. 
• To advocate implementation of existing ap-
proaches to attack the drunk driving problem, 
and to serve as a clearinghouse for disseminat-
ing new information and techniques to the 
States. 
• To identify long-term prevention and educa-
tion approaches which can be taken to reduce 
the problem. 
The Commission's Approach 
To address each of the functions assigned to the 
Commission and to accomplish the goals it estab-
lished, the Chairman created three Committees 
within the Commission with the following charges: 
Education and Prevention Committee: To en-
courage the development and institution of a 
public and private sector information and 
education program which is designed to (1) in-
crease public awareness of the drunk driving 
problem; (2) stimulate greater efforts by local 
community action groups; (3) establish social 
norms which deter drunk driving; (4) establish 
long-term education and prevention programs; 
and (5) encourage the availability of effective 
treatment programs. 
Enforcement and Adjudication Committee: To 
encourage enhanced enforcement, prosecu-
tion, and adjudication of the drunk driving of-
fense through increased use of (1) selective en-
forcement techniques; (2) improved hardware 
and training; (3) effective prosecution and 
sanctioning; and (4) improved assessment and 
follow-up in order to establish effective deter-
rent programs for the general driving popula-
tion and apprehended drunk drivers. 
Executive and Legislative Leadership Commit-
tee: To encourage public and private sector ex-
ecutives and organizations, and legislative 
leaders at State and local levels to support 
enhanced systematic drunk driving programs 
that include (1) coordinators at the State and 
local level; (2) financial support mechanisms; 
(3) emphasis through government and private 
sector policy statements; and (4) equitable and 
enforceable laws. 
Individual members of the Commission had first-
hand knowledge of the problems associated with 
arrest, prosecution, and adjudication of DUI of-
fenders. Others had expertise in State legislatures, 
the media, and in the education and treatment of 
offenders. However, in order to obtain the views of 
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a series of hearings. The Commission listened to 
victims of drunk driving crashes or to their 
families, as well as to enforcement officers, prose-
cutors, judges, and probation personnel. Educa-
tors, legislators, health leaders, the clergy, the 
media, and business executives also contributed 
their views on the problem and possible solutions. 
The information learned during these hearings 
and from testimony and papers submitted by world 
wide experts was all considered by the Commission 
in developing the recommendations contained in 
the Interim Report to the Nation. That report, 
dated December 13, 1982, was distributed to more 
than 4,000 individuals, organizations, and associa-
tions, including officials, governors, State 
legislators, police chiefs, motor vehicle ad-
ministrators, health professionals, and corporate 
executives. Their comments and recommendations 
were solicited, and we were gratified by the 
response. More than 600 thoughtful responses 
were received by the Commission and were con-
sidered when preparing this Final Report to the 
Nation. 
Chronology of Commission Activities 
—April 14, 1982—President Reagan signed Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12358 establishing the Com-
mission and appointed John A. Volpe as the 
Chairman. 
-May 18, 1982-White House Press Release 
distributed with the names of the individuals ap-
pointed to the Commission. 
—June 4, 1982—First Commission meeting. The 
Commission was briefed on the problem, avail-
able tools and resources, and State and local ex-
periences. The Commission discussed actions to 
be taken and organizational approaches. 
-July 14, 1982-The Education and Prevention 
Committee, chaired by Dr. Morris Chafetz, held 
a working meeting in Washington, D.C., to 
establish a Committee agenda. 
—August 2 and 3, 1982—The Executive and Legis-
lative Leadership Committee, chaired by Gover-
nor Frank White of Arkansas, held a meeting 
and a public hearing in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma. 
-August 9-11, 1982-The Enforcement and 
Adjudication Committee, chaired by Judge Sher-
man Finesilver, held a meeting and a public hear-
ing in Denver, Colorado. 
—September 8, 1982-The Education and Preven-
tion Committee held a public hearing in Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
—September 13, 1982-The Commission met in 
Scottsdale, Arizona, in conjunction with the an-
nual meeting of the National Association of 
Governors' Highway Safety Representatives. 
The purpose of the meeting was to review Com-
mittee progress and to report on the results of 
the hearings held to date. 
-October 4, 1982-The Enforcement and Ad-
judication Committee held a public hearing in 
Chicago, Illinois, to receive comments on its 
draft findings. 
—October 8, 1982—The Education and Prevention 
Committee held a meeting in Washington, D.C., 
to prepare its draft recommendations. 
-October 25 and 26,1982-The Commission held a 
public hearing in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 
—November 4 and 5,1982-The Commission held a 
public hearing in Detroit, Michigan. 
—November 8 and 9, 1982-The Executive and 
Legislative Leadership Committee held a public 
hearing in San Francisco, California. 
—November 29, 1982-The Commission held a 
public hearing in Washington, D.C., to obtain in-
formation from national organizations and 
associations on their plans to address the drunk 
driving problem. 
—November 30 and December 1, 1982-The Com-
mission held a meeting in Washington, D.C., to 
assess findings to date and to prepare its Interim 
Report. 
—December 13, 1982-The Commission presented 
a copy of its Interim Report to President Reagan 
and began distributing over 4,000 copies for 
review and comment. 
-May 18 and 19, 1983-The Commission held a 
meeting in San Antonio, Texas, to consider com-
ments received on the Interim Report, to review 
recent events, and to consider changes to be in-
corporated in the Final Report. 
—September 26, 1983—The Commission held its 
final meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, to approve 
this Final Report and to establish a continuing 
National Body. 
The Commission's Recommendations 
In making its recommendation, the Commission 
acknowledges that driving under the influence is 
basically a State and local problem for which State 
and local solutions must be found. The Commission 
sees its report as a catalyst for such action and as a 
source of guidance for the States and localities as 
they develop effective, long-term programs to 
combat drunk driving. State and community of-
ficials have enthusiastically responded to the Com-
mission's leadership in its Interim Report; this 
response must continue if we as a nation are to see 
a reduction in the deaths and injuries caused by 
drivers under the influence of alcohol. 
The Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving 
believes that any program adopted to respond to 
the drunk driving problem should include six (6) 
key elements: 
—First, drunk driving must be recognized as 
socially unacceptable. We must focus on bringing 
about changes in society's attitude of toleration 
toward drunkenness and drunk driving. The 
public must realize that the grave consequences 
of driving under the influence require each of us 
to take the personal responsibility for prevention 
in our own social circles. 
—Second, since attitudes about drinking and driv-
ing are largely shaped within the community, 
and because the primary administrative respon-
sibility for our efforts to combat drunk driving 
rests with the groups and governments at that 
level, efforts must have a community focus. 
—Third, because attempts to deal with the problem 
involve a large number of governmental agencies 
and private groups, a systems approach must be 
employed to ensure that the activities of these 
groups are coordinated and interrelate smoothly 
to enhance their effectiveness. 
—Fourth, in order to ensure that our laws play 
their proper role in discouraging the largest 
possible number of potential drunk drivers, 
States and localities should take a general deter-
rence approach in developing short-term 
remedies to the problem, with the focus on in-
creasing the perception of risk of arrest. 
—Fifth, to help develop personally responsible 
drinking and driving behavior, and to build a 
community consensus behind effective counter-
measure programs, citizen support through 
grassroots groups must be encouraged. 
—Sixth, because drivers under the influence are 
responsible for this problem with its great 
resulting human cost, it is appropriate that of-
fenders should defray the costs of enforcement, 
prosecution, adjudication, treatment, and educa-
tion. 
The Commission recognizes that alcohol-related 
programs, especially those relating to enforcement 
and adjudication, can and should be made self-
funding. Such a recommendation is included in this 
report. Furthermore, the Commission emphasizes 
the need for an adequate funding mechanism at the 
Federal level which would allocate monies to 
States and local communities, as well as to the 
private sector. This combined approach would en-
sure the timely and orderly implementation of the 
Commission's recommendations, resulting in a 
coordinated systems response to the national 
tragedy of alcohol-related crashes. We take note 
that federal incentive grants are currently 
available to States that adopt many of the Commis-
sion's recommendations, for example, enactment 
of a 21 year old minimum legal purchasing age for 
alcohol. 
The Commission further recommends that the 
Administration and the Congress consider not only 
general and traditional dedicated revenue sources, 
e.g., The Highway Trust Fund, but new dedicated 
funds as well. 
The Commission's recommendations are 
organized according to the major elements con-
tained in the Commission's program for combating 
drunk driving. The recommendations are 
presented under the following headings: 
Public Awareness 
Public Education 
Private Sector 
Alcoholic Beverage Regulation 
Systems Support 
Enforcement 
Prosecution 
Adjudication 
Licensing Administration 
Education and Treatment 
A word of caution. The Commission believes 
that, to achieve a lasting impact, no one element of 
this program can be enacted by itself; a coor-
dinated, decade-long commitment to a multi-
faceted approach must be taken by every State and 
community. No one suggestion or recommendation 
and no single aspect of the system can produce the 
results the Nation desires. The Commission 
realizes that the long-term impact which we all 
desire can be achieved only through a long process, 
culminating in the only guarantee of permanent 
change: changes in individual attitude and 
behavior. To promote that change, the Commis-
sion's recommendations are: 
PUBLIC AWARENESS 
Drunk driving is one of a multitude of important social 
problems that vie for an American's attention. A well-
designed and sustained public awareness program, 
however, can keep the %*driving-under-the-influence" is-
sue before the public long after the initial wave of public 
interest has passed. Carefully planned and coordinated 
releases to the media can be used to inform the general 
public of new laws, increased law enforcement, and the 
success of efforts to reduce driving under the influence. 
The program should consist of the following elements: 
Recommendation—Public Information 
Campaign 
A media program should be developed and coordi-
nated among appropriate agencies in each State, in 
cooperation with the private sector, to focus on alcohol 
use and abuse and their correlation to highway safety. 
Properly included should be information relating to 
new laws, fatalities and injuries, arrests, and current 
program activities. Specifically, the program should 
have the following aims: 
(1) To increase public awareness of the risks of a 
crash caused by drinking and driving; 
(2) To heighten the perceived risk of apprehen-
sion, especially by urging newspapers to re-
port names and addresses of persons ar-
rested and/or convicted of driving under the 
influence, and also of those whose licenses 
have been suspended or revoked; 
(3) To encourage responsibility on the part of the 
general public to intervene in DUI situations 
and to provide education on how to do so; 
(4) To support private organizations in the estab-
lishment of prevention programs; and 
(5) To foster awareness of the health benefits of 
safety belts, child restraint devices, and ad-
hering to the 55 mph speed limit. 
Commentary 
Highly publicized law enforcement programs have 
proven effective in bringing about short-term reductions 
in alcohol-related crashes. Programs to inform the public 
about increased law enforcement activities should there-
fore be pursued as a means of preventing intoxicated driv-
ers from getting behind the wheel of a motor vehicle. 
Other segments of the public awareness campaign 
should focus on the potential offender's social activity and 
environment. Since alcohol in sufficient quantities impairs 
a person's ability to judge his or her own ability to drive, 
friends, associates, and family members must be informed 
of appropriate intervention strategies that can deter an 
intoxicated person from driving. In some communities, 
social disapproval of drunk driving is expressed when local 
newspapers print the names of all persons arrested and/or 
convicted of driving under the influence. 
Since no program of deterrence can be expected to 
achieve complete success, the public should be informed 
that the use of safety belts and child restraints can reduce 
the death and injury toll in motor vehicle crashes by 50 
percent. In addition, the public should be informed that 
compliance with the existing speed limit mitigates the 
result of a crash. 
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Recommendation—Administration 
Each State should identify a single coordinating agen-
cy for public information and education programs to 
minimize or prevent issuance of contradictory mes-
sages that confuse the public and endanger long-term 
continuity of combined efforts. 
Commentary 
The public has shown an increasing readiness to take 
action to prevent driving under the influence. If these 
energies are to be effectively mobilized, people must be 
given clear messages about how they can prevent such 
behavior and reduce their own risk of death or injury at the 
hands of a person driving under the influence. A coordinat-
ing agency could coordinate messages, eliminate duplica-
tion, and highlight significant media events. 
Also, many people are confused about the amount of 
alcohol which can cause impairment. Coordinated efforts 
and coordinated messages within each State, and among 
the States, can reduce such confusion. 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Public education programs complement public aware-
ness programs by inducing long-term changes in attitudes 
and behavior toward alcohol abuse. The ultimate goal of 
public education on the drunk driving issue is to make 
(trunk driving and intoxication itself socially unaccept-
able. Over the long term, the need to retain the social 
approval of one's peers may be a more powerful incentive 
to avoid intoxication and drunk driving than fear of arrest 
or involvement in a crash. The change in social attitudes 
toward smoking during the past decade and the subse-
quent decline in smoking are an example of how power-
fully such social reinforcement can affect behavior. 
To be effective, educational programs to promote new 
social norms should be tailored to the audience and should 
promote positive actions to be taken to prevent alcohol 
abuse or driving under the influence. Programs to promote 
long-term behavior changes should include: 
Recommendation—Media and 
Influential 
Editorial boards and media trade associations should 
encourage their associates and members to communi-
cate with the public reguiariy about alcohol use and 
abuse and highway safety. 
Television and radio program managers and film 
makers should portray alcohol use and abuse and 
highway safety in a responsible manner, and, where 
appropriate, use program content to communicate 
with the public about the problem of driving under the 
influence. 
The clergy in each community should periodically re-
mind their congregations about their responsibility for 
highway safety, particularly in regard to alcohol use 
and abuse. 
Medical schools and associations should give a high 
priority to alcohol use and abuse issues in their curric-
ula and organizational agendas. Physicians should be 
encouraged to educate their patients. 
Commentary 
Community-wide encouragement and reinforcement of 
changed social norms are a must if real progress is to be 
made in DUI statistics. Education through the media and 
through influential citizens has a strong impact, par-
ticularly if the messages are uniform and the efforts are 
coordinated to maximize the public's exposure to preven-
tive education. 
Recommendation— Youth Programs 
The best hope for prevention lies in teaching people 
how to prevent drunk driving among those in their own 
social circles—family, friends, neighbors, and co-
workers. Young people must be a primary focus, both 
because they are at greatest risk for involvement in 
motor vehicle crashes and because their driving and 
drinking habits are still in the formative stages. Pro-
grams must include a variety of curricular and extra-
curricular educational activities: 
(1) Curricula concerning alcohol, drugs and 
other impairments on the body and their rela-
tionship to highway safety should be in-
cluded as part of general school curricula 
promoting values clarification and decision-
making skills. Training for teachers and 
school counselors is an essential ingredient. 
(2) Extracurricular programs in junior and senior 
high schools and in colleges should be pub-
licized and encouraged. 
(3) Driver education programs should include in-
formation on the effects of alcohol, drugs, 
and other impairments on the body. 
(4) Athletic clubs and other youth organizations 
should establish programs for members and 
their peers concerning the use and abuse of 
alcohol, drugs, and other impairments on the 
body. 
Commentary 
Alcohol education has been shown to have a significant 
impact on young peoples knowledge and attitudes about 
alcohol abuse. When alcohol education is incorporated in 
the curriculum as a part of general life skills training, 
alcohol loses its lustre as a magical potion. The record 
indicates that young people have responded to educational 
programs designed to illustrate the danger of alcohol mis-
use, particularly when programs begin early in the educa-
tional process. Studies have shown that children as young 
as five can distinguish between the effects of alcoholic and 
non-alcoholic beverages. 
In addition, since young males represent a dispropor-
tionately high risk category for motor vehicle crashes, 
alcohol education should emphasize the reasons males are 
more susceptible, e.g., careless driving at high risk hours 
as a means of demonstrating masculinity, or expressing 
anger or aggression. These concepts should be reinforced 
in driver education programs. Such educational programs 
should also discuss drugs and other impairments on the 
body that can cause highway crashes. 
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PRIVATE SECTOR 
If new social norms are to evolve as a primary means of 
preventing drunk driving, then prevention activities 
should be focused on natural social settings, particularly 
the work place and local organizations. Social ties among 
people in these environments will help strengthen each 
person's sense of responsibility to preserve the lives and 
safety of people near and dear to them. 
Private sector support of drunk driving prevention pro-
grams should be sought in all industries, since all of us are 
affected by the results of drunk driving. Those industries 
which deal with alcohol or motor vehicles, however, 
should be especially involved in prevention. The motor 
vehicle is a part of the equation that results in alcohol-
related crashes. Hence, it is important that those engaged 
in selling, insuring, and maintaining motor vehicles coop-
erate in public information and education programs. Alco-
hol's pharmacological effects also put a great burden of 
responsibility on producers, distributors, servers, and 
purveyors of alcoholic beverages to prevent misuse of 
these beverages and to prevent dangerous actions on the 
part of people who misuses alcohol. 
Recommendation—General Outreach 
Corporations and industry trade associations, labor 
organizations, civic, fraternal, and social organiza-
tions should: 
(1) Develop and disseminate to employees and/ 
or members policy statements regarding the 
use and abuse of alcohol and alcohol's rela-
tionship to highway-related deaths and inju-
ries, and implement these policies at com-
pany-sponsored events. 
(2) Implement educational programs directed to-
ward their employees and customers con-
cerning the problems caused by driving un-
der the influence and the solutions available. 
(3) Implement employee assistance programs to 
deal with employees' alcoholism problems. 
(4) Become active advocates and participants in 
local or State endeavors to reduce driving 
under the influence. 
Commentary 
Alcohol can affect judgment and tends to inhibit recall of 
recently learned information. Combined, these effects 
make an intoxicated person a poor judge of his or her own 
fitness to drive. Hence, the burden of responsibility for the 
public safety falls not only on the intoxicated person but on 
the social network, the support group in which he or she 
moves. Drinking to excess should be made unacceptable at 
group events, and group members should be made aware of 
specific means to prevent those who do drink excessively 
from endangering themselves and others. Alternatives by 
way of non-alcoholic beverages should be available at com-
pany parties and large social gatherings. Employee assis-
tance programs and other programs, such as taxi pro-
grams which provide free rides home for employees under 
the influence, assist employees to overcome problems and 
to establish behavioral norms. 
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Recommendation—Motor Vehicle 
Related Industries 
Motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers should in-
clude in their owners' manuals, advertising programs, 
showrooms, and local sales efforts information on the 
hazards of combining alcohol use and driving and the 
benefits in reducing death and injury of using safety 
belts and child restraints and adhering to the 55 mph 
speed limit. 
Insurance companies should include in their policy 
billings, advertising and sales materials, and agent 
information kits, information on the hazards of com-
bining alcohol use and driving and the benefits in re-
ducing death and injury of using safety belts and child 
restraints and adhering to the 55 mph speed limit. 
Gasoline stations and motor vehicle repair shops 
should display signs informing their customers of the 
law and their responsibility relating to the hazards of 
combining alcohol use and driving and the benefits in 
reducing death and injury of using safety belts and 
child restraints and adhering to the 55 mph speed limit. 
Commentary 
It is important that those who are engaged in selling, 
insuring, and maintaining motor vehicles cooperate in in-
forming the public about driving under the influence. In-
novative programs and research currently being carried 
out by some companies should be continued and expanded. 
The public should be provided with specific information on 
how to avoid excessive drinking when driving. 
The public should be kept informed about safety belts 
and child restraints and encouraged to use these restraints 
themselves and to urge their passengers to use them. 
Similarly, the public should continue to be informed about 
the safety benefits of complying with the 55 mph speed 
limit. 
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Recommendation—Alcoholic Beverage 
Industries and Servers 
The beer, wine and distiiled spirits industries at the 
producer, wholesale and retail levels should either ini-
tiate or expand educational programs to warn the pub-
lic of the hazards of drinking and driving. 
Package stores, bars, restaurants, fraternal and social 
organizations, and other establishments having an al-
coholic beverage license should display signs inform-
ing customers of the law relating to alcohol use and 
highway safety. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commissions should en-
courage owners of retail establishments which serve 
alcoholic beverages to provide their employees with 
education on alcohol use and abuse and highway 
safety. 
Schools for bartending should provide education and 
training concerning alcohol use and abuse and high-
way safety. 
Party hosts should be provided information on ways of 
entertaining that help prevent the abuse of aicohol at 
social functions and on methods of intervening to pre-
vent intoxicated guests from driving. 
Commentary 
Most Americans use private motor vehicles as their 
primary means of transportation. Hence, if excessive 
drinking takes place outside the home, the likelihood ex-
ists that an impaired person will attempt to drive. Alco-
hol's pharmacological effects put a great burden of respon-
sibility on servers and purveyors of alcoholic beverages to 
prevent misuse of these beverages and to prevent dan-
gerous actions on the part of guests or patrons who misuse 
alcohol. Approximately 20 States have either statutes or 
court decisions which impose udram shop liability" on com-
mercial servers of alcoholic beverages. As part of their 
responsibility to prevent misuse of what they sell, pur-
veyors of alcoholic beverages should take care to see that 
customers are reminded of the illegality and danger of 
driving under the influence. 
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ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE REGULATION 
Laws and regulations specifying the manner in which 
alcoholic beverages can be sold, places where such prod-
ucts cannot be consumed, and the liability for providing 
these products to visibly intoxicated persons support a 
comprehensive approach to reduce the incidence of alco-
hol-related traffic crashes. 
Recommendation—Minimum Legal 
Purchasing Age 
States should immediately adopt 21 years as the mini-
mum legal purchasing and public possession age for 
all alcoholic beverages. 
Legislation at the Federal level should be enacted 
providing that each State enact and/or maintain a law 
requiring 21 years as the minimum legal age for pur-
chasing and possessing ail alcoholic beverages. Such 
legislation should provide that the Secretary of the 
United States Department of Transportation disap-
prove any project under Section 106 of the Federal Aid 
Highway Act (Title 23, United States Code) for any State 
not having and enforcing such a law. 
Commentary 
There is evidence of a direct correlation between the 
minimum drinking age and alcohol-related crashes among 
the age groups affected. Studies have shown that raising 
the legal drinking age produced an average annual reduc-
tion of 28 percent in nighttime fatal crashes involving 
affected 18- to 21-year-old drivers. One of the studies 
indicated that if all remaining States raised the legal 
drinking age to 21, there would be 730 fewer young per-
sons killed annually on United States highways. 
Considering that during the last legislative sessions, 
three additional States passed laws requiring a minimum 
drinking age of 21 for all alcoholic beverages, the total 
number of States with such a law is 19. The lack of unifor-
mity among State laws is especially critical regarding the 
10 
minimum legal drinking age because an incentive to drink 
and drive is established due to young persons commuting 
to border States where the drinking age is lower. There is 
simply no way to adequately address the needless trag-
edies caused by young persons commuting to border 
States except by establishing a uniform drinking age 
among the States. 
In order to reduce the death rate of American youth, the 
minimum legal drinking age for all alcoholic beverages 
should be raised to 21. 
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Recommendation—Dram Shop Laws 
States should enact "dram shop" laws establishing 
liability against any person who sells or serves alco-
holic beverages to an individual who is visibly 
intoxicated. 
Commentary 
Dram shop laws are not intended to replace common law 
liability or vigorous enforcement of State ABC regulations 
as useful countermeasures to driving under the influence. 
With the increasing movement to strengthen victims' 
rights, dram shop laws may facilitate compensation and 
help deter illegal sales of alcoholic beverages. These laws 
implicitly establish the necessity of placing responsibility 
on the part of the seller or server, whether they be com-
mercial or individual hosts. Dram shop laws also rein-
force the principle that others have a responsibility to 
prevent intoxicated individuals from driving. 
References 
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• Comment, "Dram Shop Liability—A Judicial Re-
sponse,11 57 CaL L. Rev. 995, 996-1000 (1969). 
• "Dram Shop Acts, Common Law Liability and State 
Alcohol Beverage Control Enforcement as Potential 
DWI Countermeasures," Contract No. DTNH 
22-81C-Q7601, NHTSA 1982. 
Recommendation—Alcoholic Beverage 
Consumption in Motor Vehicles 
State and local governments should prohibit con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages in motor vehicles and 
prohibit the possession of open alcoholic beverage 
containers in the passenger compartments of motor 
vehicles. 
Commentary 
A number of States have enacted, in one form or another, 
laws which prohibit a person from possessing alcoholic 
beverages in open or unsealed containers in public. Gener-
ally, these laws take one of two forms. The first prohibits 
such possession in a public place; the second prohibits such 
possession only in the passenger compartments of motor 
vehicles. (NOTE: In the latter, some State laws prohibit 
such possession only by the driver, while other States 
apply such prohibition to all vehicle occupants.) 
It is recommended that the States enact such laws re-
garding the possession by occupants of open/unsealed con-
tainers in the passenger compartments of motor vehicles. 
Certainly it is counterproductive to DUI law compliance if 
persons driving motor vehicles have ready access to alco-
holic beverages. In addition, it seems obvious that vehicle 
passengers also should be prohibited from having such 
containers, since they could be handed an open container 
by a driver when law enforcement officials are near. Such 
actions by drivers would, in effect, nullify the purpose of 
an open container law. 
Reference 
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SYSTEMS SUPPORT 
Effective responses to driving under the influence must 
take a systematic approach. Piecemeal responses suggest-
ing we can solve the problem by quickly changing laws or 
adding a few new programs are not likely to succeed. Such 
approaches fail to recognize that our past failure to re-
spond effectively to the problem is not simply a result of 
the lack of a particular law or program. State and local 
officials, and leaders of public and private groups must 
take a systematic view of the problem, a view which 
recognizes the interrelationships between legal, health, 
public informational, educational and technological re-
sponses to the problem. The response must include all 
elements of society, it must involve the individual, and it 
must be sustained over a long period of time. This ap-
proach should indlude the following: 
Recommendation—Program Financing 
Legislation should be enacted at State and local levels 
which creates a dedicated funding source including 
offender fines and fees for increased efforts in the 
enforcement, prosecution, adjudication, sanctioning, 
education and treatment of DUI offenders. 
Commentary 
A high priority should be attached to the development of 
an ongoing funding source that will increase the level and 
effectiveness of local enforcement and prosecution for driv-
ing under the influence. Without such mechanisms, many 
community police agencies and prosecutors will continue 
to attach a low priority to DUI laws, despite the fact that 
the social and human costs of alcohol-related crashes are 
far higher than the resultant costs of violent crimes which 
generally receive greater local attention. 
Establishment of a dedicated funding plan whose avail-
ability is contingent on the development of a local plan will 
lead local governments to take a systems-oriented ap-
proach, resulting in the development of a more coherent, 
unified response. A requirement should be included for the 
coordination and periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of 
these programs. Funding should be provided by increased 
fines or fees derived from alcohol-related offenses. Other 
possible sources of revenue, such as increased driver's 
license fees, fuel taxes, or alcoholic beverage fees or taxes, 
should be examined on a needs basis. 
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Recommendation—Citizen and Public 
Support 
Citizen Support: Grassroots citizen advocacy groups 
should be encouraged to continue fostering aware-
ness of the DUI problem, to cooperate with govern-
ment officials, prosecutors and judges to deal more 
effectively with the alcohol-related crash problem, and 
to encourage the development of personally responsi-
ble drinking/driving behavior. 
Task Forces: State and local governments should 
create task forces of governmentai and non-govern-
mental leaders to increase public awareness of the 
problem, to apply more effectively DUI laws, and to in-
volve governmentai and non-governmental leaders in 
action programs. 
National Body: A non-governmental body of public 
and private leaders should be established at the na-
tional level to ensure a continuing focus on efforts to 
combat driving under the influence. 
Commentary 
The continued growth of grassroots groups and the es-
tablishment of task forces is crucial to the development of 
more effective local and State responses to driving under 
the influence. These complementary activities focus public 
attention on the seriousness of the problem and the need 
for more effective action, on the one hand, and on the 
development of laws and programs by public and private 
leaders to address this need, on the other. The con-
tinuation of these groups and task forces also provides a 
mechanism to review program implementation and to eval-
uate program effectiveness. 
A national organization can provide technical and lead-
ership assistance for all organizations joining in this effort. 
Such an organization would continue to command the at-
tention of the Federal Government, the national media, 
and other national organizations. This organization could 
also monitor the effectiveness of legal, procedural, and 
programmatic changes, and communicate these results to 
State and local governments as well as the private sector. 
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Recommendation—Criminal Justice 
System Support 
Priority: Police, prosecutors and courts should pub-
licly assign a high priority to enforcing DUI statutes. 
Training: Police, prosecutors, judges, and other re-
lated justice system personnel should participate in 
entry level and annual in-service training programs 
established to improve the detection, prosecution, and 
adjudication of DUI offenders. 
Legal Updates: Prosecutors should provide local en-
forcement agencies and courts with periodic legal up-
dates on developments and/or changes in the DUI 
laws. 
Legal System Review: The Chief Justice or highest 
appellate judge in each State, in the interest of unifor-
mity and effectiveness, should convene an annual 
meeting of all components of the legal system to re-
view the progress and problems relating to DUI of-
fenses and issue a report of the results. 
Commentary 
Management priorities are critical to effective enforce-
ment, prosecution and adjudication. Enforcement agen-
cies, prosecutors and courts should establish and follow 
policies which give high priority to DUI offenses. They 
should periodically inform the public of these policies and 
the actions taken to reduce driving under the influence. 
The public must understand that the risk of apprehension, 
conviction, and punishment is high. 
Tb achieve these goals, police, prosecutors and judges 
should receive training in detection, apprehension, pros-
ecution, and adjudication of DUI offenders. The number 
and quality of arrests can be increased if police officers 
receive a minimum of 40 hours basic training and 20 hours 
annual in-service training. New judges and prosecutors 
are generally assigned to the trial of DUI cases. They 
should receive entry level and annual in-service training in 
the trial of such cases, and in alcohol abuse and its relation 
to highway safety. Prosecutor training of enforcement offi-
cials also enhances the effectiveness of the officers' collec-
tion and presentation of evidence in cases prosecuted un-
der new DUI laws. Public defenders, without whom the 
criminal justice system cannot function, should likewise 
receive initial and ongoing training in the trial of DUI 
cases. 
To assure the system is working, a continuous mecha-
nism is needed to review arrest procedures, existing laws, 
charging and sentencing procedures, the effectiveness of 
alternative sanctions, and the adequacy of diagnostic, 
screening, rehabilitation and correctional facilities and 
programs. The results of this review should be made avail-
able to the public, the legislative bodies, and the executive 
branches of State and local governments. 
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Recommendation—Tracking and 
Reporting Systems 
Record System: Police, prosecutors and courts 
should collect and report DUI apprehension, charging 
and sentencing information to the state licensing au-
thority. Convictions on military and Federal lands, in-
cluding Indian tribal lands, should also be reported. 
The State licensing authority must maintain a traffic 
records system capable of tracking offenders from ar-
rest to conviction or other disposition, including sanc-
tions imposed by both judicial and licensing au-
thorities. This system should also be used for 
evaluation purposes. 
Uniform Traffic Ticket: State and local governments 
should adopt a statewide uniform traffic ticket system. 
Driver License Compact: Each State should adopt the 
Driver License Compact and the one license/one rec-
ord policy, while also utilizing the National Driver 
Register. 
Commentary 
Accurate, timely and accessible records are essential to 
effective enforcement, prosecution, adjudication, and sen-
tencing. Courts should submit disposition information to 
the State driver licensing authority within 30 days. Police 
and prosecutors should also report arrest and charging 
information. State driver licensing authorities should 
provide courts and prosecutors with rapid access to driver 
records. 
A single State agency should compile all information 
relative to charging, disposition and sentencing by juris-
diction and court. It should also report this information 
annually to the public, the legislative bodies, and the ex-
ecutive branches of State and local governments. This 
information should also be made available to military and 
Federal officials. 
There is a need for a comprehensive DUI enforcement 
reporting system. Use of a uniform citation system will 
facilitate data gathering. This system will also contribute 
to the integrity of the criminal justice process and assist 
analytical and statistical evaluation. Such systems have, 
been recommended since 1957 by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and, since 1963, 
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. A well 
designed, controlled and audited system can be expected 
to improve court records, assure the proper accounting of 
money from fines and fees, and verify that conviction rec-
ords are, in fact, received by the State driver record 
agency. 
The Driver License Compact has been adopted by 30 
States. It covers interstate aspects of driver misconduct. If 
a drive-' from State A is convicted of a traffic offense in 
State I), the Compact requires State B to report to State 
A. State A treats the conviction as though it occurred in 
State A, Additionally, when an individual move* from one 
State to another and applies for a license, the old license 
must }><• surrendered. This comprehensive system estab-
lishes rntnpiete. amirate and useful d n w r history rec-
ords. The National Driver Reenter, a central file of all 
suspended or revoked drivers licenses, should be used to 
reirforce this concept. This computerized system would 
allow rapid transfer of information among the States. 
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Recommendation—Safety Belt and Child 
Restraint Usage Laws 
States should enact safety belt and child restraint 
usage laws. 
Commentary 
Currently. 41 States and the District of Columbia have 
enacted child restraint usage laws. Most other western 
nations have enacted safety belt usage laws. The use of 
safety belts and child restraints is the best protection 
against the drunk driver. The use of safety belts by drivers 
and passengers will reduce the chance of a fatal or serious 
injury by 50 percent. Child restraints are even more effec-
tive for young children. 
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IMPROVED ROADWAY DELINEATION 
AND SIGNING 
States should give increased attention to improvements in 
roadway markings and signing, and roadside hazard vis-
ibility as important countermeasures to alcohol-related 
highway crashes. 
Commentary 
Because the majority of severe alcohol-involved crashes 
occurs at night on rural two-lane highways, greater atten-
tion should be given to low-cost roadway environmental 
improvements having a cost-effective safety potential for 
the alcohol-impaired driver. 
Proven roadway environment technologies, such as ade-
quate delineation through road marking, signing, and im-
proving visibility of roadside hazards offset the visual im-
pairment which medical and highway safety research has 
identified as a critical factor in alcohol-involved crashes. 
They are also beneficial for drivers who are unimpaired or 
who suffer from youthful driving inexperience or from 
visual impairment associated with fatigue or old age. 
Developing technologies, such as the use of wider edge 
lines, improved roadway signing, and other delineation 
techniques should be encouraged. 
State highway departments should employ statistical 
and problem identification techniques to design and apply 
roadway environmental improvements to counter alcohol-
related highway crashes. 
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ENFORCEMENT 
Enhanced enforcement coupled with wide publicity has 
proven time and again to be a deterrent to driving under 
(he influence. There is an obvious need for law enforce-
ment agencies to establish strong policies on the enforce-
ment of DUI laws and to implement these policies on a 
consistent basis. The nttd is demonstrated by this fact: the 
average arrest rate for driving under the influence is two 
(2) a year per uniformed officer, resulting in a very low 
probability of being arrested. The following recommen-
dations will help improve enforcement: 
Recommendation—Selective 
Enforcement and Road Blocks 
Police agencies should apply selective enforcement 
and other innovative techniques, including the use of 
preliminary breath testing devices and judicially ap-
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proved roadblocks, to achieve a high perception of risk 
of detection for driving under the influence. 
Commentary 
The techniques and technology of crime analysis should 
be applied to driving under the influence. Police agencies 
should identify high incidence areas and times, and assign 
resources accordingly. They also should use "checkpoints'* 
(roadblocks) to increase the risk of apprehension and the 
publics perception of that risk. Guidelines must be de-
veloped for the use of "checkpoints." 
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Recommendation— Chemical Testing 
Implied Consent: Each State should establish an "im-
plied consent" statute which provides that all drivers 
licensed in that State are deemed to have given their 
consent to tests of blood, breath, or urine to determine 
their alcohol or drug concentration. The statute shouid 
provide: 
Sufficiently severe license suspensions to discourage 
drivers from refusing the test. 
That a test refusal can be introduced at a DUI trial as 
evidence of consciousness of guilt. 
That offenders who are unconscious or otherwise in-
capable of refusal are deemed to have given their con-
sent to a test, the results of which are admissible in any 
trial or proceeding. 
That an individual's right to consult his attorney may 
not be permitted to unreasonably delay administration 
of the test. 
That results of preliminary breath test devices be ad-
missible in the DUI trial proceedings. 
That refusals in sister States shall result in license 
suspensions in the State of driver residence. 
Preliminary Breath Testing: States should enact a stat-
ute allowing the use and admissibility in evidence of 
Preliminary Breath Test (PBT) devices by police 
officers. 
Police Choice of Chemical Tests: The arresting officer 
should determine the appropriate chemical test or 
tests to be administered to the driver suspected of 
driving under the influence. 
Mandatory BAC Test: States should require mandatory 
alcohol and other drug testing of: (1) ali drivers fatally 
injured, and (2) where there is probable cause to sus-
pect alcohol involvement, all drivers involved in a fatal 
or serious personal injury crash. 
Commentary 
Laws which facilitate the use of chemical tests and test 
results and discourage test refusals are a key to the effec-
tive enforcement and prosecution of DUI offenders. Im-
plied consent laws which provide for the above provisions 
enhance both the enforcement and prosecution of offend-
ers. Similarly, a Preliminary or Pre-Arrest Breath Test 
(PBT) is a valuable and reasonable use of poiice authority 
when the officer has an articulable and reasonable suspi-
cion that violation of the DUI laws has occurred. The tests 
enable an officer in the field to make a quick and simple 
determination as to whether a person is impaired or under 
the influence in marginal cases, and whether an arrest is 
justified. 
Once an arrest is made, police officers, not arrestees, 
should determine which chemical tests will most accu-
rately show the suspects type and level of impairment. 
This allows the police officer to select the least time-con-
suming test or the most appropriate test to check for other 
impairments such as drugs. Breath tests cannot currently 
determine the presence of drugs. Finally, an objective 
measurement of alcohol involvement in fatal crashes is 
essential if States and local governments are to know the 
extent of their problem and measure program effective-
ness. Laws which require testing of all fatally injured 
drivers and of drivers involved in fatal crashes provide a 
basis for the collection of data for such measurements. 
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Recommendation—Booking Procedures 
Laws, policies, and procedures should be adopted to 
expedite arrest, booking, and charging procedures. 
Commentary 
Several States require the arresting officer to spend 
unnecessary time completing the entire arrest procedure 
himself or to be present for the entire process. This occui's 
despite the fact the jurisdiction may have the capability for 
booking, chemical testing, and processing without the ar-
resting officer. Many States utilize this alternative to re-
duce officer down time i.e., return the officer to patrol 
duties as soon as possible, and to increase significantly the 
efficiency of the entire arrest process. 
Reference 
• "Arrest Procedures for Driving While Intoxicated," 
DOT-HS-*<>r>-nM. 
Recommendation—Citizen Reporting 
Citizens should be encouraged by governmental and 
non-governmental groups to report drivers under the 
influence. 
Commentary 
Several States have programs encouraging citizens to 
report drivers observed to be under the influence. This 
program of citizen involvement increases the publics per-
ceived and actual risk of apprehension and adds to general 
deterrence. For example, in Nebraska, from June \{M to 
May 1982, 2,836 suspected drunk drivers were reported to 
police, and, as a result, police intercepted 1,827 potentially 
drunk drivers and arrested 1,428. Similar results have 
been achieved in Colorado, Oregon, and other States. 
Reference 
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PROSECUTION 
The public prosecutor is responsible for, among many 
other things, evaluating, charging and trying DUI cases. 
Historically, prosecutors have not given DUI cases a high 
priority; consequently, they frequently engage in pica 
bargaining the DUI case. This results in reduced or mini-
mal sanctions and reinforces the social acceptability of 
drinking and driving. 
Prosecutors have largely failed to recognize or appreci-
ate the impact, good and bad, that their attitudes and 
policies can have on the problem of the drinking driver. It 
is time for the prosecutor to assume a leadership role in 
dealing with the problem. 
Moreover, the various State laws are extremely vague. 
In many jurisdictions, prosecutors must show that alcohol 
has affected a driver's nervous system so that he is incapa-
ble of driving a vehicle with the caution characteristic of a 
sober person. This loose standard of culpability leads to 
numerous trial difficulties. In response to those diffi-
culties, the Commission recommends enactment of a .10 
illegal per se standard, a .08 presumption, and other 
provisions to streamline trial. 
The following recommendations should increase the 
effectiveness of prosecutors: 
Recommendation—Plea Bargaining 
Prosecutors and courts should not reduce DUI 
charges. 
Commentary 
Prosecutors should charge accurately, not overcharge or 
undercharge, and insist upon conviction on the appropri-
ate charge. Prosecutors should not routinely plea bargain 
1)1:1 charges to non alcohol-related offenses. Plea bargain-
ing undermines the express will of the electorate and 
minimizes the consequences of engaging in illegal be-
havior. No DUI charge should be reduced or dismissed 
unless a written declaration is filed by the prosecutor 
stating why, in the interest of justice, it requires a reduc-
tion, or why the charge cannot be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
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Recommendation—Definition of BAC 
States should enact a definition of 'breath alcohol con-
centration' and make it illegal to drive or be in control 
of a motor vehicle with a breath alcohol concentration 
above that defined level. 
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Commentary 
Legislation defining breath alcohol concentration, as 
well as blood alcohol concentration, can simplify prosecu-
tions in these cases by eliminating the necessity in court of 
converting the results of such tests to corresponding blood 
alcohol levels. Breath testing has become so widespread 
and corresponds so closely to Blood Alcohol Con-
centrations that breath alcohol concentration should be 
defined each time in its own terms rather than in terms of 
blood alcohol. 
Reference 
• Uniform Vehicle Code, Section 11-902 (a)(5), 1979. 
Recommendation—0.08 Presumptive 
Level of Under the Influence 
Legislation should be enacted which provides that a 
person with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 is pre-
sumed to be driving under the influence. 
Commentary 
Medical and driving demonstration studies show that 
most people are impaired at an alcohol level of 0.08. The 
law should recognize this fact and presume that people are 
under the influence at this level and lack the ability to drive 
safely. Two States (Idaho and Utah), Canada, and the 
United Kingdom have such laws. 
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• Hurst, P.M., "Estimating the Effectiveness of Blood 
Alcohol Limits," Behavioral Research in Highway 
Safety l(2):87-99, 1970. 
• "Alcohol and Highway Safety 1978: A Review of the 
State of Knowledge,1* DOT-HS-803-7U. 
Recommendation—0.10 Illegal Per Se 
Legislation should be enacted making it illegal per se 
for a person with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or 
higher within three hours of arrest to drive or be in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle. 
Commentary 
Individuals with an alcohol content of 0.10 or higher are 
clearly under the influence and lack the ability to drive 
safely. Laws making it illegal to drive with these levels of 
alcohol content increase the certainty of conviction, reduce 
litigation time and costs, and enhance public safety. Thir-
ty-seven States have adopted this "illegal per se law." A 
person should be deemed to be in violation of this "illegal 
per se law" if the blood alcohol test is taken within three 
hours of arrest and shows 0.10 or higher. 
Reference 
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Recommendation—Appellate Action 
Prosecutors should initiate appropriate appellate ac-
tions to ensure judicial compliance with statutory 
mandates governing DUI cases. 
Commentary 
Due to heavy case loads, judicial bias and other reasons, 
courts frequently ignore mandatory sentencing require-
ments in DUI cases. Unless the prosecutor is willing to 
seek an appellate remedy, the practice will continue 
unchecked. 
ADJUDICATION 
Judges are a critical part of any effective approach in 
curtailing the alarming rise in alcohol related driving 
offenses. In the true American tradition, the accused is 
entitled to a fair trial and due process of law in these and 
other criminal charges. However, once guilt is established 
in alcohol related offenses, judges should not hesitate to 
impose realistic penalties, sentences, and fines, which 
carry real deterrent value. 
Perhaps we should take note of Justice Cardozo's 
celebrated precept that "justice, though due to the accused, 
is due the accuser also (297 U.S. 97, 122). Beneficiaries of 
justice cannot be offenders only. The public, the other 
party to the action, cannot be ignored. It should be kept in 
mind that the public, and not only the defendant, has 
certain rights. Thus, the judiciary plays a vital role in 
discouraging driving under the influence. There are about 
21,000 judges hearing traffic cases in the nation's 17,000 
courts. DUI cases constitute a substantial portion of their 
caseload. Nonetheless, most of these judges have had little 
formal training in either the adjudication of these cases or 
in alcohol use and traffic safety. All too often, the judiciary 
fails to view driving under the influence as a serious offense 
meriting certain, swift, and appropriate punishment. 
Furthermore, State laws frequently fail to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense; therefore, sentences for violat-
ing the law are not always prescribed. Offenders often 
receive minimal, if any. punishment for errant behavior. 
Courts frequently impose lenient sentences without re-
gard for the offender's driving and criminal record, alco-
hol problems, or the damage caused to the victims. This 
undercuts any general deterrent effect of the laws regulat-
ing the drinking driver. 
The following recommendations are intended to im-
prove the adjudication of DU1 cases: 
Recommendation—Mandatory 
Sentencing 
Sentencing of DUI Offenders: The sentences recom-
mended herein upon conviction of driving under the 
influence should be mandatory and not subject to sus-
pension or probation. Specifically, the recommend-
ations are that: 
All States establish mandatory substantial minimum 
fines for OUI offenders, with correspondingly higher 
mandatory minimum fines for repeat offenders. 
Any person convicted of a first violation of driving 
under the influence should receive a mandatory li-
cense suspension for a period of not less than 90 days, 
plus assignment of 100 hours of community service or 
a minimum jail sentence of 48 consecutive hours. 
Any person convicted of a second violation of driving 
under the influence within five years should receive a 
mandatory minimum jail sentence of 10 days and li-
cense revocation for not less than one year. 
Any person convicted of a third or subsequent viola-
tion of driving under the influence within five years 
should receive a mandatory minimum jail sentence of 
120 days and license revocation for not less than three 
years. 
Sentencing of License Violators: States should enact a 
statute requiring a mandatory jail sentence of at least 
30 days for any person convicted of driving with a 
suspended or revoked license or in violation of a re-
striction due to a DUI conviction. 
Commentary 
Courts presently have broad discretion to sentence 
drinking drivers. They typically fine, restrict the license, 
and impose educative or rehabilitative conditions of proba-
tion on DUI offenders. Judges do not ordinarily impose jail 
sentences or require direct community service. 
The law must have some bite if we are to deter drinking 
and driving. Mandatory jail sentences or directed work 
and license suspensions should effectively deter DUI. 
Offenders must know they will certainly and swiftly be 
sentenced to those penalties if they violate the law. They 
must also understand that subsequent violations will re-
sult in the imposition of progressively more severe 
penalties. 
Although studies reveal that drivers license suspension' 
revocation is more effective in reducing crashes than are 
fines, jail, or alcohol education programs, between 1()S0 
percent of drivers with suspended, revoked or restricted 
licenses drive illegally. This continuing violation of laws 
merits increased punishment. This will impact par-
ticularly on those drivers who have had their licenses 
revoked as a result of a DUI conviction. 
References 
• "Pers pert ive on DUI Sanctions: A Reviciv of Current 
Programs/' XHTSA Contract: DTXH-2J-
SI-C-oJlTJ. 
• Ehrlich, "The Deterrent Effect nf Criminal Laic En-
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Influence Offenses." California DMV <Hagen). 1978. 
• "Suspension and Revocation Effects ov the DUI Of-
fender" California DMV (Hagen et al.j. 19S0. 
• "License Revocation and Alcoholism D'eatment Pro-
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Recommendation—Felony 
Causing death or serious bodily injury to others while 
driving under the influence should be classified as a 
felony. 
Commentary 
Criminal law typically treats causing death or serious 
bodily injury as a felony. It is no less serious when caused 
by a person who drives while under the influence. Classify-
ing these offenses as felonies rather than misdemeanors 
makes available the threat of longer term imprisonment, 
e.g.., a misdemeanor calls for no more than a year in county 
jail. 
Recommendation—Court Administration 
Speedy Trials: OUI cases at the trial ievei should be 
concluded within 60 days of arrest. Sentencing should 
be accomplished within 30 days. The appellate pro-
cess should be expedited and concluded within 90 
days. 
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TYaffic Infractions: To relieve court congestion and to 
focus attention on DUI cases, minor traffic infractions 
should be adjudicated by simplified and informal 
procedures. 
Commentary 
Swift and certain punishment effectively deters crimi-
nal conduct. Courts should not continue cases without 
showing good cause in writing. 
Traditional criminal court processing of low-risk traffic 
offenses is not necessarily highway safety cost-effective. 
Several States have established a lower risk traffic offense 
adjudication system as a part of an administrative agency 
or within the judiciary. These systems permit the courts to 
focus attention on the most serious offenses, such as driv-
ing-under-the-influence, and to improve court efficiency. 
References 
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stitute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 
LEAA, U.S. Department of Justice, August 1978. 
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Recommendation—Pre-Conviction 
Diversion 
Pre-conviction diversion to alcohol education or alco-
hol treatment programs should be eliminated. A find-
ing on the charge should be rendered and participation 
in education or treatment programs should then be-
come a condition of sentencing. 
Commentary 
In many jurisdictions the DUI offender may be eligible 
for diversion, a process by which legal proceedings are 
abated if the offender complies with certain court-imposed 
conditions. When these conditions are met, charges are 
dismissed. It is as if no offense occurred. This practice 
undermines the enforcement of DUI laws because no prior 
conviction appears on the individual's record. It dis-
courages enforcement, minimizes the gravity of the of-
fense committed, and is inconsistent with a general deter-
rence model of appropriate sanctions. 
Recommendation—Presentence 
Investigation 
Before sentencing, a court should obtain and consider 
a presentence investigation report detailing the defen-. 
dant's driving and criminal record, and, where possi-
ble, an alcohol problem assessment report. In ail cases 
an alcohol problem assessment report should be com-
pleted by qualified personnel prior to the determina-
tion of an education or treatment plan. 
Commentary 
In many jurisdictions, judges sentence offenders with-
out a presentence report. Courts should be provided the 
offender's driving and criminal record, and an alcohol prob-
lem assessment, in order to impose an appropriate sen-
tence. The report should include all alcohol related of-
fenses, including public intoxication, and should be 
completed by qualified personnel. 
References 
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Recommendation—Victim Programs 
Victim Restitution: Any person convicted for driving 
under the influence who causes personal injury or 
property damage should pay restitution. 
Eiimination of Bankruptcy Loophole: The United 
States Congress should enact legislation which elimi-
nates the possibility that a drunk driver, judged civilly 
liable, will be able to escape the penalties of civil action 
by filing for bankruptcy. 
Victim Assistance: State and local governments and 
private and volunteer organizations should provide 
assistance to victims of DUI offenders. 
Victim impact Statements: State and local govern-
ments or courts by rule should require victim impact 
statements (including oral or written statements by 
victims or survivors) prior to sentencing in all cases 
where death or serious injury results from a DUI 
offense. 
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Commentary 
Those injured b\ DTI offenders are the forgotten vic-
tims of the legal system. Where feasible criminal courts 
should order offenders to pay for property damage, medi-
cal expenses, and lo>t wages to victims or their families. 
Where State law precludes this, civil action should be 
initiated to ensure restitution. Additionally, legislation 
should be enacted providing a victim compensation fund. 
Currently, a drunk driver judged liable for death, injury, 
or property loss may seek to have the court discharge his 
or her liability under Federal bankruptcy laws. Only those 
acts which are determined to be willful or malicious are 
considered nondi>chargeable under current law When a 
debt is incurred by a debtor as the result of an act of drunk 
drning, that debt should not be dischargeable regardless 
of any court finding that willful, wanton or reckless be-
havior \\a< or was not involved. 
Prosecutors should inform victims about available com-
munity services. They should also keep the victim or the 
victim's family informed about the progress of the case and 
its ultimate disposition. In cases where serious injury or 
death results from driving under the influence, the victim 
or the victims familv .should have the right to comment to 
the court prior to >entencing. A statutory provision re-
quiring the courts to establish procedures for this purpose 
should be enacted. 
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LICENSING ADMINISTRATION 
Suspension or re\ocation of drivers' licenses can be an 
effective deterrent to driving while under the influence 
Studies in California and Washington show that license 
suspension was more effective than assignment at \iolj 
tors to alcohol education and/or treatment programs. If 
suspensions are imposed consistently and are highly pub-
licized, this sanction can pla\ an important role in reduc 
ing driving under the influence. 
Cooperation among the States in sharing information 
on driver licensing and violations in order to stop those 
with revoked or suspended licenses from becoming li-
censed in another State is a necessity The following 
recommendations are intended to improve the administra 
tmn of fhf licensing process 
Recommendation—Administrative Per 
Se License Suspension 
States should enact legislation to require prompt sus-
pension of the license of drivers charged with driving 
under the influence, upon a finding that the driver had 
a BAC of 0.10 in a legally requested and properly ad-
ministered test. The prompt suspension should also 
extend to those who refuse the test, as well as those 
who are driving in violation of a restricted license. 
Such suspension may be carried out by the arresting 
law enforcement agency, the court upon arraignment, 
or the administrative agency charged with license ad-
ministration. There should be reciprocity among 
States to assure a driver's license suspension by the 
home State if the driver meets these conditions In 
another Slate, 
Commentary 
Some States have begun to use innovative methods to 
establish administrative penalties for driving under the 
influence. In 17 States today, any driver registering above 
0.10 BAC has his or her license automatically suspended 
for 60-90 days or more regardless of the subsequent dis-
position of his or her case. If he or she refuses the test, his 
or her license is suspended for up to 180 days. This is a 
swift and certain sanction which significantly adds to the 
general deterrent effect of the control system. The indi-
vidual is afforded the opportunity of a hearing within a 
specified period of time. The findings to be made at this* 
hearing relate to whether the individual tested over the 
legal limit or whether the individual refused the test. 
A different approach, used in New York for repeat 
offenders, provides for an immediate temporary suspen-
sion pending disposition of the charges. This system is 
carried out by the court where there is a finding of proba-
ble cause for the arrest and where there is a DUI convic-
tion within the past five years. These two approaches also 
differ in their administration; the New York system is 
administered by the local criminal courts for the Motor 
Vehicle Department, while the other States' systems are 
administered by the State dnver licensing agency. 
References 
• "Analytical ^tndg of Minnesota Lcni, " Robert H 
Reeder, Northwestern Traffic Institute, December 
1981 
• Uniform Vehicle Code, Section 6-205 and b-208. 
Recommendation—Restricted Licenses 
Each State driver licensing authority should review its 
practice of issuing Occupational Hardship Driver Li-
censes following suspension or revocation and estab-
lish strict uniform standards relative to issuance and 
control of such limited driving privileges. These li-
censes should be issued only in exceptional cases. In 
no event should this be done for repeat offenders. 
Commentary 
Occupational Hardship Driver Licenses are normally 
issued on the basis of the establishment of an economic 
hardship due to the driver's stated inability to commute to 
his or her workplace. Since an economic hardship has 
nothing to do with the person's ability to operate safely a 
motor vehicle, issuance of such privileges should be done 
only after a professional evaluation and establishment of a 
prognosis regarding the driver's use or abuse of alcohol. 
Also, employers should be required to verify the driver's 
exact work schedule and need to drive a motor vehicle. The 
days and hours during which the person may drive should 
be indicated on the provisional license. 
Recommendation—Provisional License 
for Young Drivers 
States should adopt laws providing a provisional li-
cense for young beginner drivers which would be with-
drawn for a DUI conviction or an implied consent 
refusal. 
Commentary 
Young drivers are particularly over represented in alco-
hol-related highway crashes. Statistics indicate that alco-
hol-related highway deaths are the leading cause of death 
for 16- to 19-year-old Americans. 
Approximately 35 States have some special license lim-
itations for drivers under age 18. However, there is consid-
erable variation as to the terms, conditions, or limitations 
of such licenses. 
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Recommendation—Licensing 
Information 
Driver Licensing Manuals should discuss the relation-
ship of alcohol and drugs to highway safety and in-
clude the penalities for arrest and conviction of driving 
while under the influence. 
Motor Vehicle Administrators should include in license 
and motor vehicle registration renewal applications 
information on the relationship of alcohol and drugs to 
highway safety. 
Driver's License Examinations should include ques-
tions specifically designed to determine the appli-
cant's knowledge of the relationship of alcohol and 
drugs to highway safety, as well as to his or her under-
standing of the laws governing such conduct. 
Commentary 
The operation of a motor vehicle is a privilege entailing, 
among other things, responsibility for the safety of others. 
Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for all 
Americans under 44 years of age. Since alcohol impaired 
drivers are the major cause of highway deaths and injuries, 
information about the driver's responsibility to avoid such 
impairment should be given whenever he or she obtains or 
renews a license to drive, registers or re-registers a motor 
vehicle, and at other times when drivers come in contact 
with motor vehicle administrations. Additionally, individ-
uals who have had their license revoked, suspended, or 
restricted due to an alcohol-related offense should be re-
quired to take a specific test relating to alcohol and high-
way safety prior to the return of driving privileges. 
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EDUCATION AND TREATMENT 
Problem drinkers cause a disproportionately large share 
of drunk driving incidents when their number is compared 
with the total drinking and driving population. Only a 
small percentage of nonproblem drinkers get in trouble 
when they drive after drinking, but because the number of 
nonproblem drinkers is very large, the small percentage 
that does get into trouble translates into a large number of 
crashes. 
Evidence also supports the fact that borderline and 
repeat problem drinkers, irresponsible drinkers, and so-
ciopathic types for whom drunk driving is but one man-
ifestation of generally lawless behavior contribute signifi-
cantly to the number of serious drunk driving crashes. 
Rehabilitation programs must provide a mechanism for 
identifying and rehabilitating each type of offender and 
for determining that the offender has received and bene-
fited from rehabilitation services before being permitted 
sume driving privileges, Education and rehabilitation, pro-
grams are particularly important for young offenders. The 
following elements are recommended in, the education 
and treatment area: 
Recommendation—Assignment Process 
Rehabilitation and education programs for individuals 
convicted of driving under the influence should be 
provided as a supplement to other sanctions, and not 
as a replacement for those sanctions. 
Pt esentence investigations, including alcohol assess-
ments conducted by qualified personnel, should be 
available to all courts in order to appropriately classify 
the defendant's problem with alcohol. Repeat offend-
ers should be required to undergo medical screening 
for alcoholism by a physician trained in alcholism, an 
alcoholism counselor, or by an approved treatment 
facility. 
Alcohol education programs should be usee! :)nly for 
those first offenders who are classified as social drink-
ers and for those who have had no previous exposure 
to alcohol education programs. Problem drinkers and 
repeat offenders should be referred to more intensive 
rehabilitation programs. 
Alcohol treatment and rehabilitation programs should 
be available for individuals judged to need such serv-
ices. The programs should be tailored to the individu-
al's needs, and the individual should be assigned to 
such programs for a length of time determined by treat-
ment personnel and enforced by court probation. 
State insurance commissioners should require andor 
State legislators should enact legislation requiring 
health insurance providers to include coverage for the 
treatment and rehabilitation of alcohol and other drug 
dependent persons In all health insurance policies. 
Commentary 
Education and treatment programs are not substitutes 
for appropriate penalties to be assessed upon those who 
violate the law. Rather, they should be looked upon as 
adjuncts to legal and administrative sanctions, intended to 
address the knowledge, attitude, and behavioral problems 
that may underlie driving under the influence. Education 
or treatment programs should be used as a carefully 
chosen response to the particular circumstances of the 
offenders problem with alcohol. Qualified personnel are 
required to assess and individual's problem with alcohol. 
Alcoholism is an illness, and as such should be covered 
by health insurance programs. Without such coverage, 
individuals tend to ignore treatment and or seek treat-
ment under other diagnoses, while denying the underlying 
illness of alcoholism. In the long run, insurance carriers 
and society end up paying more if coverage is not provided. 
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Recommendations—Compliance 
When assignments are not; complied with, the courts 
or the administrative licensing agency must take steps 
to impose further restrictions on driving privileges or 
to assess further penalties as spelled out ii i the origi-
nal sentence, 
A records reporting system should be available to as-
sure that individual offenders assigned to education or 
treatment services do in fact comply with the assign-
ments, and to make information on compliance avail-
able fo motor vehicle administration officials at the 
time of appeal ance for relicensing. 
Offenders should be required to appear in person to 
request return of driving privileges and should be 
given appropriate tests to determine their level of 
knowledge about alcohol and its relation to highway 
safety, as well as about the laws governing operation 
of a motor vehicle white under the influence of alcohol. 
Commentary 
In a country where the primary means of tranportation 
is the passenger car, restrictions on driving privileges can 
be an effective means of assuring compliance with DUI 
laws. In addition, the public's safety and welfare is en-
hanced if dangerous drivers are removed from the road 
until they receive appropriate education or treatment. Re-
turn of a suspended or revoked license should not be 
granted automatically. The burden of proof of respon-
sibility for being a safe driver and. or '< r--- - -< tN--.n-. a 
problem should be on the offender. 
Recommendation—Juvenile Offinders 
Juvenile offenders should be required to participate in 
a program which closely follows the requirements for 
adult offenders. 
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Commentary 
Young drivers are at high risk of involvement in motor 
vehicle crashes. Education and rehabilitation programs 
are particularly important for young offenders in order to 
prevent future dangerous driving. 
Recommendations—Administrative 
State standards, criteria and review procedures should 
be established for alcohol education schools, treat-
ment and rehabilitation services, and community serv-
ice programs. A State agency should be assigned re-
sponsibility to certify to the courts the alcohol 
education and treatment and rehabilitation programs 
that meet established criteria and standards. This 
same agency should make efforts to draw upon and 
involve appropriate existing programs, e.g., employee 
assistance programs. 
States should develop and implement an on-going 
statewide evaluation system to assure program quality 
and effectiveness. 
Individuals should be assessed fees for education or 
treatment and rehabilitation services at a level suffi-
cient to cover the costs. 
Commentary 
Quality control in rehabilitation programs is a must if 
confidence is to be placed in such programs. To assure 
uniform standards for such quality control, national 
guidelines and criteria should be developed by an indepen-
dent body for use by States to certify and evaluate educa-
tion and treatment services. The data from such evalua-
tions could then be used to modify and upgrade programs 
based on new information which highlights the forms of 
education and treatment that show the greatest success 
with drivers under the influence. 
Self sufficiency of such programs is paramount. The 
drunk driver should be required to pay for the services to 
which he or she is assigned. 
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Exhibit E 
UTAH DUI SUMMARY 
AUGUST 198? - JULY 198*. 
DATA AS OF DECEMBER 1984 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
LARRY E. LUNNEN, Commissions 
REPARED BY UTAH HIGHWAY SAFETY,DIVISION 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
In August, 1983, a new Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or 
Drugs (DUI) law went into effect. The following information is for the 
first year tinder the new law. Information given here is from the DUI 
Tracking System in Driver License Services. 
ACTIVITIES AUGUST, 1983 - J 0 L 1
 t 1984 
DUX arrests averaged 1,064 per month for a total of 12,768, This Is 
an increase of approximately 9% over the previous year. 
' rhe greatest number of arrests were made in Salt Lake, Utah, Davis, 
avc Weber Counties. They accounted for 9,065 arrest or 712 of a11 
arrests in the state 
Young drivers and male drivers were heavily represented in the arrest 
statistics. 87% were males and 60% were between 18 and 32 years of age. 
Alcohol related fatal accident involvement also shows a disproportionate 
number of young male drivers, therefore, it appears that police are 
targeting the greatest risk population for enforcement. Only 18% of DUI 
arrests were 4? years o,l ci or more. 
The average blood alcohol content (BAC) of those tested was .15%. 
There were 1,789 or 14% of those arrested who refused a test. This Is 
approximately the same proportion of refusals as prior to the new law. 
Driver License Services held 3,538 hearings related to DUI •• h 
blood alcohol test refusals and half for per se license violations 
7,696 licenses were suspended under the new Law allowing administrative 
action. 
The Highway Patrol made 18Z of the arrests for DUI, and County 
Sheriff Offices made another 18%. Another 64% were made by City Police 
Departments or other pol ice agencies. 
nut of state drivers were arrested 1,841 f lines while those with Utah 
drivers licenses amounted to 10,927 ur 861 of lbr total. 
Previous records of those arrested showed 3,646 DUI convictions and 
1,797 suspensions or revocations of driver licenses for other 
violations. These relate only to Utah drivers• 
Two thirds of the arrests have court dispositions on file. DUI 
convictions for 7,394 cases have been reported while 746 convictions for 
something other than DUI are shown, and 124 acquittals or dismissals have 
been reported. The one third of arrests where no court reports have been 
received probably include many cases not filed by city or county 
attorneys, or were dismissed, found not guilty or continued by the COUIL, 
appealed, or just haven't been sent in yet. Efforts will be made to 
identify disposition of these 4,500 cases, 
Based on court abstracts rprp-fvAH onhiai f-f«<ae n«.-i r« 
DUI ARRESTS BY COUNTY 
COUNTY 
BEAVER 
BOX EIDER 
CACHE 
CARBON 
DAGGETT 
DAVIS 
DUCHESNE 
EMERY 
GARFIELD 
GRAND 
IRON 
JUAB 
KANE 
MILLARD 
MORGAN 
PIUTE 
RICH 
SALT LAKE 
SAN JUAN 
SANPETE 
SEVIER 
SUMMIT 
TOOELE 
UINTAH 
UTAH 
WASATCH 
WASHINGTON 
WAYNE 
WEBER 
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
39 
255 
377 
226 
19 
1466 
221 
103 
32 
190 
192 
109 
70 
205 
43 
5 
60 
5030 
168 
80 
151 
187 
330 
376 
1517 
90 
188 
9 
1030 
12768 
PERCENT 
.31 
2.00 
2.95 
1.77 
.15 
11.48 
1.73 
.81 
.25 
1.49 
1.50 
.85 
.55 
1.61 
.33 
.04 
.46 
39.40 
1.32 
.62 
1.18 
1.47 
2.59 
2.95 
11.88 
.70 
1.47 
.07 
8.07 
100.00 
DUI ARRESTS BY MONTH 
nxrrn 
AUGUST 1983 
SEPTEMBER 1983 
OCTOBER 1983 
NOVEMBER 1983 
DECEMBER 1983 
JANUARY 1984 
FEBRUARY 1984 
MARCH 1984 
APRIL 1984 
MAY 1984 
JUNE 1984 
JULY 1984 
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
871 
1049 
1134 
998 
1045 
911 
944 
1211 
1168 
1208 
1125 
1104 
12768 
PERCENT 
6*82 
8.22 
8.88 
7.82 
b. .* 
7.14 
7.39 
9.49 
9.15 
9.46 
8.80 
8.64 
100.00 
TYIT ARRESTS BY JURISDICTION 
AGENCY NUMBER PERCENT 
SHERIFF'S OFFICES 2319 18.16 
CITY POLICE/OTHER 8199 64.22 
HIGHWAY PATROL 2250 17.62 
TOTAL 1 276ft 
: . D I 8 T R I I 
UTAH OUZ ARRESTS 
8 / 1 / 9 3 - 7 / 3 1 / 8 4 
- . 13X 
:OM 
T0TAL»12»7A8 
REFUSED- 1*789 
MO TEST/UWKNCMN- 91f 
I 1 > 1 } I I I I I I » { I I 
• 0 8 X . 1 A X . 32X 
N T R A T X O N 
AVERAGE B.A.C • 15 
NIWBER PERCENT BAC NUMBER PERCENT 
38 
17 
31 
23 
30 
59 
85 
114 
303 
338 
441 
523 
605 
631 
738 
762 
750 
755 
704 
616 
594 
.30 
.13 
.24 
.18 
.24 
.46 
.67 
.89 
2.37 
2.65 
3.45 
4.10 
4.74 
4.94 
5.78 
5.97 
5.87 
5.91 
5.51 
4.83 
4.65 
.21 
.22 
.23 
.24 
.25 
.26 
.27 
.28 
.29 
.30 
.31 
.32 
.33 
.34 
.35 
.37 
.40 
.43 
.52 
REFUSAL 
NO TEST 
RESULTS UNK 
TINVMHUN 
452 
382 
263 
209 
160 
106 
92 
84 
52 
39 
22 
14 
11 
9 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1789 
5 
700 
ru 
3.54 
2.99 
2.06 
1.64 
1.25 
.83 
.72 
.66 
.41 
.31 
.17 
.11 
.09 
.07 
.02 
.02 
.01 
.01 
.01 
14.00 
.04 
5.48 
1.67 
ORXVERS AftRESTCO FOR O .U .Z . 
I N UTAH 
• / I ' H I - ' i l l il i 
Unk 17 20 23 2« 29 32 3S 38 41 44 47 30 S3 36 39 62 A3 AS 71 74 7 ,' I 
T » - 4 F * C E V E * = * « « * c e C R O U P S 
DUl ARRESTS BY SEX 
'".n NUMBER PERCEW1 
MALE 
FEMALE 
UNKNOWN 
11111 
1634 
23 
87.02 
12.80 
.18 
DUl ARRESTS BY AGE 
AGE NUMBER PERCENT 
UNKNOWN 
15 - 17 
18 - 20 
21 - 23 
24 - 26 
27 - 29 
30 - 32 
3 3 - 3 5 
36 - 38 
39 - 41 
42 - 44 
45 - 47 
48 - 50 
51 - 53 
5 4 - 5 6 
57 - 59 
60 - 62 
63 - 65 
66 - 68 
69 - 71 
72 - 74 
7 5 - 7 7 
78 - 80 
OVER 80 
16 
1224 
1887 
1753 
1567 
1274 
1034 
881 
605 
564 
444 
328 
282 
217 
139 
171 
77 
59 
29 
III 
1',, 
5 
.13 
1.39 
9.59 
14.78 
13.73 
12.27 
9.98 
8.10 
6.90 
4.73 
4.42 
3.48 
2.57 
2.21 
1.70 
1.09 
1.34 
.60 
.46 
.23 
.13 
.11 
.04 
DRIVER LICENSE DATA 
TOTAL HEARINGS 
PER SE HEARINGS 
REFUSAL HEARINGS 
ADM SUSPENSIONS 
3538 
1803 
1737 
7696 
50.96 (% OF HEARINGS) 
49.10 (% OF HEARINGS) 
60.28 (% OF ARRESTS) 
DRIVING RECORD PRIOR TO AUGUST 1,1983 
PREVIOUS DUI CONVICTIONS 
PREVIOUS DUI REDUCED TO RECKLESS 
PREVIOUS DUI WITH ACCIDENT 
PREVIOUS OTHER VIOLATION WITH ACCIDENT 
PREVIOUS SUSPENSION OTHER VIOLATIONS 
PREVIOUS REVOCATION DUI 
PREVIOUS REVOCATION OTHER VIOLATIONS 
DRIVERS LICENSED IN UTAH 
DRIVERS LICENSED IN OTHER STATES 
MBER 
3151 
9 
495 
1341 
713 
3325 
1084 
10927 
1841 
PERCENT OF 
ARRESTS 
24.68 
.75 
3.88 
10.50 
5.58 
26.04 
8.49 
85.58 
14.42 
CONVICTIONS 
PENDING 
COURT ABSTRACTS 
NUMBER 
4504 
8264 
PERCENT 
OF ARRESTS 
35.28 
PERCENT 
OF ABSTRACTS 
NA 
TOTAL 12768 
DUI CONVICTIONS 
OTHER CONVICTIONS 
DISMISSAL/ACQUITTAL 
7394 
746 
124 
7.91 
5.84 
.97 
89.47 
9.03 
1.50 
SENTENCING 
AVERAGE AMOUNT OF FINE 
AVERAGE AMOUNT SUSPENDED 
AVERAGE JAIL SENTENCE 
AVERAGE DAYS SUSPENDED 
AVERAGE DAYS SERVED 
J.P. COURT ABSTRACTS 
CIRCUIT/DISTRICT COURT 
JUVENILE COURT 
COURT TYPE 
NUMBER 
2723 
5457 
84 
$323.00 
$ 16.00 
74 DAYS 
63 DAYS 
11 DAYS 
PERCENT OF 
ABSTRACTS 
33.00 
66.00 
1.00 
TOTAL 8264 100.00 
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Exhibit F 
ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES 
AND FATALITIES "" 
UTAH ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL 
:pnPARED 
iTALT'CRA 
T O , TOTAC 
S.HES l-
7 3 7 4 75 7 6 77 73 79 8 0 8 1 8 2 8 3 YEARS C 1 3 7 3 - 1 3 8 3 > 
1 c r L UTAH ALCOHOL RELATED 
l O U f c - I Y v 
7 3 ' 74 "75" "65"7 " " 
YEARS C 1 3 7 3 7 7 8 7 3 8 0 $ 1 8 2 8 3 1 3 8 3 3 
THE HIGHEST YEAR FOR ALCOHOL RELATED FATALITIES SINCE 1973 WAS 1981 
THE YEAR WITH THE GREATEST PERCENTAGE OF ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES SINCE 
1 9 7 3 WAS 1 9 8 0 
MAMiotuHgi^g" ACCIDENTS 
-
 U T A H 
U « 
LU 
r: 
-X 
I I ( 
LU 
4 80 
3 * j n 
j y u 
1OC 
TOTAL FATAL CRASHES 
TOTAL FATALITIES 
TOTAL ALCOHOL FATAL CRASKS?
 s 
TOTAL ALCOHOLS RELATED FAt^<VV " 
TOTAL PEOPLE KILLED 
TOTAL DRIVERS KILLED 
TOTAL PASSENGERS KILLED 
TOTAL PEDESTRIANS KILLED 
TOTAL BICYCLISTS KILLED 
19i: »* -J.* 
COMPARIS 
V/A 
E3 
982 
263 
296 
100 
113 
113 
61 
35 
15 
2 
SON 
F A T A L I T I E S 
A--R F A T A L I T I E 
1983 
253 
283 
94 
101 
101 
58 
21 
22 
0 
uVUM'^T SUMMARY 
J! WV'P ACCIDENTS BY MONTH 
JANUARY 
FEBRUARY 
MARCH 
APRIL 
MAY 
JUNE 
JULY 
AUGUST 
SEPTEMBER 
OCTOBER 
NOVEMBER 
DECEMBER 
OTAL 
8 
6 
9 
5 
10 
8 
11 
8 
7 
10 
8 
4 
PERCENT 
8.5 
6.4 
9.6 
5.3 
10.6 
8.5 
11.7 
8.5 
7.5 
10.6 
8.5 
4.3 
IN 1983 ALCOHOL RELATED F.V 
AND 10.6% IN OCTOBER. 
»^<v>VS 10.6% OCCURRED IN MAY, 11.7% IN JULY 
>;0 »*AN 
ALCOHOL ACCIDENTS BY TIME AND DAY 1983 
N 
U 
n 
B 
E 
R 
O 
F 
C 
R 
A 
S 
H 
E 
S 
7f 
HON TUE UED 
TiriE 
ww w*1* THU FRI 
AND DAY 
DAY OF WEEK 
MONDAY 
TUESDAY 
WEDNESDAY 
THURSDAY 
FRIDAY 
SATURDAY 
SUNDAY 
TOTAL 
11 
6 
10 
17 
9 
23 
18 
TIME OF DAY 
PERCENT 
11.7 
6.4 
10.6 
18.1 
9.6 
24.5 
19.1 
TOTAL PERCENT 
MIDNIGHT-3:59AM 
4:00AM-7:59AM 
8:00AM-11:59AM 
NOON-3:59PM 
4:00PM-7:59PM 
8:00PM-11:59PM 
29 
8 
3 
7 
18 
29 
30. 
8. 
3. 
7, 
19. 
30.9 
IN 1983 ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES 61.8% OCCURRED BETWEEN 8P.M. AND 4A.M. 
AND 24.5 OCCURRED ON SATURDAY. 
1983 ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES 
FIRST HARMFUL EVENT 
5CW-
^ i 
L3cJ-
Eidt s
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UTAH A / R FATAL C R A S H E S - 1 3 8 3 
Q ^ J U R N 
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FIRST HARHFUL EUENT 
101 
Si 
UTAH A / R FATAL C R A S H E S - 1 3 8 3 
F 
A 
T 
A 
L 
C 
R 
A S 
H 
E S 
7\ 
61 
51 
4i 
3i 
21 
l i 
OU=OUERTURN 
F O = F I X E D 
OBJECT 
P E = P E D . 
INUOLUED 
HO=nOTOR 
UEHICLE 
SU=TOTAL 
SINGLE 
UEHICLE 
HU=TOTAL 
HULTI-
UEHICLE 
ou FO PE no su nu 
FIRST HARMFUL EUENT 
IN 1983 ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES, 26.6X (25) INVOLVED A COLLISION WITH 
ANOTHER VEHICLE AND 73.kl (69) INVOLVED ONLY ONE VEHICLE 
1 9 8 3 ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES 
BY CLASS OF TRAFFICTAY 
M f i n t UTAH ALCOHOL RELATED 
g|3 IZIIIZ^ZAZII?*ASTJES;; 
IMM* IP I I | | I > I I m i i i m M i i i i H i i f M m m t f ^ f l ¥ n ¥ f f * B f l t t i t t m i i m t i i i i i u i i i i i i / 
,,«»>,., URBAN RURAL 
URBAN/RURAL CLASSIF ICATION 
UTAH A/R FATAL CRASHES-1S83 
A=INTERSTATE 
B=U.S. / S T A T E C=LOCAL 
IN 1 9 8 3 , 57.5% ( 5 4 ) ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES OCCURRED IN RURAL AREAS AND 
39.4% ( 3 7 ) WERE ON LOCAL ROADS 
DRIVERS INVOLVED IN ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES 
AGE AND SEX 1 9 8 3 
1 5 , 
HALES 
l t l l ^ n i M U ^ H I M H I ^ I M n n ^ i n M U ^ i n M n ^ l l M l l l k L u i l t l | y H H I l 4 l H I M l | ^ M I I M ^ I M ( M « ^ n i l H i | k H I I H t ^ 
17 2 0 2 3 2 6 2 9 3 2 3 5 3 8 4 1 44 4 7 5 5 SS 
THREE YEAR AGE GROUPS 
MALE FEMALE 
15 - 17 
18 - 20 
21 - 22 
24 - 26 
27 - 29 
30 - 32 
33 - 35 
36 - 38 
39 - 41 
42 - 44 
45 - 47 
48 - 65 
OVER 65 
2 
15 
9 
8 
5 
7 
5 
6 
4 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
o 
1 
2 
1 
1 
0 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
TOTAL 71 15 
IN 1983 ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES, 21.1%0F THE DRIVERS WERE 18 TO 20 
YEARS OLD AND MALE. 
DRINKING DRIVERS IN ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES 
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT 
AVERAGE B.A.C. .15 
B.A.C. 
.00 
.01 
.03 
.04 
.05 
.06 
.07 
.08 
.09 
.10 
.11 
.12 
.13 
.14 
.15 
.16 
.17 
.18 
TOTAL 
2 
2 
3 
1 
5 
4 
2 
3 
1 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
6 
7 
2 
2 
B.A.C. 
.19 
.20 
.21 
.22 
.23 
.25 
.26 
.27 
.28 
.32 
.34 
RESULTS UNKNOWN 
TESTS NOT GIVEN 
73.2% OF THE DRIVERS WHO CONTRIBUTED BY DRINKING IN ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL 
CRASHES HAD A BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT OF .08 OR GREATER. 
TOTAL 
4 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
DRIVERS KILLED IN ALCOHOL RELATED ACCIDENTS 
AGE AND SEX 
N 
U 
n 
B E R 
0 
F 
D 
R 
I U 
F 
R 
DRIUERS INUOLUED I N ALCOHOL 
RELATED FATAL CRASHES 
1 3 8 3 
< - HALES 
- FEMALES 
•'
X
'. .<-x\ 
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17 2 0 2 3 2 6 2 3 3 2 3 5 3 8 4 1 4 4 47 4 8 5 6 
THREE YEAR AGE GROUPS 
MALE FEMALE 
15 - 17 
18 - 20 
21 - 23 
24 - 26 
27 - 29 
30 - 32 
33 - 35 
36 - 38 
39 - 41 
42 - 44 
45 - 47 
48 - 65 
OVER 65 
2 
9 
6 
4 
3 
6 
5 
4 
2 
0 
2 
3 
3 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
TOTAL 49 
18.4% OF THE DRIVERS KILLED IN ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES WERE 18 TO 20 
YEARS OLD AND MALE. 
DRIVERS KILLED IN ALCOHOL RELATED ACCIDENTS 
N i l U 
m 
E 
R 
1 4 
D 
R 
5 4, 
E 
R 
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT 
B . A . C . " S OF D R I U E R S K I L L E D 
I N ALCOHOL R E L A T E D CRASHES 
A U E R A G E = . 1 4 * 
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0 0 - 0 7 0 8 - 1 5 1 6 - 2 3 2 4 - 3 1 32 + B.A.C. GROUPS 
B.A.C TOTAL B.A.C. TOTAL 
. 0 0 
. 0 1 
.03 
.05 
.06 
.07 
.08 
.10 
.11 
.12 
.13 
.14 
.15 
.16 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
4 
3 
4 
6 
.17 
.18 
.19 
.20 
.21 
.22 
.23 
.25 
.26 
.27 
.28 
.32 
.34 
RESULTS UNKNOWN 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
81.3% (86) OF THE DRIVERS INVOLVED IN ALCOHOL RELATED ACCIDENTS WERE 
UTAH DRIVERS. 7% (6 ) WERE SUSPENDED OR REVOKED AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
22% (19) HAD PREVIOUS SUSPENSIONS ON THEIR DRIVING RECORD AND 11.6% (10) HAD 
PREVIOUS DUI'S. 74.1% HAD A B.A.C. OF .08 OR GREATER 
1983 ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL ACCIDENTS 
BY COUNTY 
ACCIDENTS FATALITIES 
BEAVER 
BOX ELDER 
CACHE 
CARBON 
DAGGETT 
DAVIS 
DUCHESNE 
EMERY 
GARFIELD 
GRAND 
IRON 
JUAB 
KANE 
MILLARD 
RICH 
SALT LAKE 
SAN JUAN 
SANPETE 
SEVIER 
SUMMIT 
TOOELE 
UINTAH 
UTAH 
WASTACH 
WASHINGTON 
WAYNE 
WEBER 
0 
2 
1 
1 
0 
5 
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
1 
32 
6 
4 
1 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3 
1 
0 
11 
0 
2 
1 
1 
0 
5 
5 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
1 
32 
7 
4 
2 
5 
3 
5 
4 
3 
1 
0 
13 
IN 1983, 62.8% OF ALL ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL CRASHES OCCURRED IN FIVE 
COUNTIES: SALT LAKE, WEBER, SAN JUAN, DAVIS AND DUCHESNE. 
ALCOHOL RELATED FATAL ACCIDENTS 
BY CITY 
ACCIDENTS FATALITIES 
CASTLEDALE 
CLEARFIELD 
CLINTON 
COTTONWOOD 
DUCHESNE 
FAIRVIEW 
FRANCIS 
GOULDING 
HELPER 
HOLLADAY 
LAYTON 
MIDVALE 
MURRAY 
NEPHI 
OGDEN 
PROVO 
SALINA 
SALT LAKE 
SANDY 
SOUTH SALT LAKE 
SYRACUSE 
TAYLORSVILLE 
WELLSVILLE 
WEST VALLEY 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
18 
2 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
2 
2 
18 
2 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Exhibit G 
Chapter 1 The Alcohol Crash 
Problem in the 
United States 
To be able to work for effective 
reform of the drunk driving prob-
lem in your State and community, 
it is first necessary to understand 
the magnitude and nature of the 
problem. 
The Problem 
There is an uncontrolled epidemic 
of dangerous alcohol-impaired 
drivers to which no one is im-
mune in virtually every com-
munity in the nation. 
There are so many drunk 
drivers on our roads at all hours 
of the day and night, seven days 
a week, that our streets are not 
safe. Weekend nights between 
the hours of 10 p.m. to 3 a.m. are 
the most unsafe. And the risk of 
violent death and brutal, devastat-
ing injury posed by drunk drivers 
has become one of the major 
threats to health and safety in 
America today. 
All levels of government have 
in the past failed to protect the 
public from drunk drivers. Little 
was being done about the prob-
lem in most States and com-
munities that would effectively 
get drunk drivers off the roads, 
despite the fact that it was and is 
possible to do so. The general 
public until recently has been vir-
tually uninformed about the 
magnitude of the problem and its 
seriousness, and this has con-
tributed to a lack of action by 
officials. 
The fact is that anytime you or 
a member of your family leave 
your home, even to go on a 
routine trip to a local grocery 
store, a drunk driver in a matter 
of seconds, without any warning, 
could violently end your life or 
the life of a member of your 
Drunk drivers kill about the same 
number of people each day as 
were killed when a jet in January 
1982 crashed into the 14th Street 
Bridge in Washington claiming 
about 70 lives. And drunk drivers 
seriously injure about 1,800 peo-
ple everyday. 
The cumulative toll taken by 
drunk drivers has become a 
monstrous national tragedy and a 
neglected national disgrace. 
Millions of people of all ages in 
the United States have suffered 
because drinking and driving has 
been allowed to become an ac-
cepted way of life in our country. 
In the past ten years alone an 
estimated 250,000 people, about 
five times the number of 
Americans killed in the Vietnam 
War, have been killed in alcohol-
related crashes. And another 
650,000 people a year have been 
seriously injured in a drunk driv-
ing collision or some 6.5 million 
in the last decade. 
This year in the United States 
another 25,000 people will be 
killed and more than 650,000 
people will be seriously injured by 
drunk drivers. In 1975 the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and 
Welfare estimated the annual 
cost of drunk driving accidents to 
be $5 billion. The current figure 
may be closer to $24 billion. And 
the problem is projected to get 
much worse in the near future 
unless immediate steps are taken 
to control drunk drivers and 
remove them from our roads. 
Currently, drunk driving is the 
most often committed violent 
crime in the nation. Drunk driving 
is a leading cause of death of 
children and a principal cause of 
quadraplegia, paraplegia, and 
unaware of the magnitude and 
nature of the American drunk driv-
ing problem. That is because the 
media until very recently failed to 
grasp the significance of the 
routine deaths and injuries 
caused by drinking drivers in 
every community. Victims suf-
fered alone and did not know how 
to effectively call for reform. 
The public was left uninformed 
about the grisly tragedy that was 
taking place in our country. And 
because the public was left unin-
formed, no pressure was mounted 
for reform. 
Studies suggest that on a 
typical Friday and Saturday night, 
one or more drivers out of every 
ten is legally drunk and a threat 
to public safety-—your safety. But 
only a very few will be caught. It 
is claimed that for every one 
drunk driver who is arrested, 
another 500 to 2,000 will escape 
detection and arrest. 
And despite the overabundance 
of drunk drivers on the road 
available to be arrested, it is also 
claimed that the average police 
officer arrests less than five 
drunk drivers a year. What it all 
means is that the chances of 
being arrested for drunk driving 
throughout most of America is 
mathematically insignificant. And 
the drinking public knows it. 
In the United States we make it 
easy for the drinking public to 
drive while dangerously intox-
icated without fear of being 
arrested. And, as a direct result of 
dangerously lax enforcement, a 
drunk driver can drive impaired 
dozens of times a year for years 
without any real risk of being 
caught. 
Accordina to on* stnHv tho 
